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ABSTRACT 
THE REGULATORY FUNCTION OF SOCIAL REFERENCING IN 
PRESCHOOLERS WITH DOWN SYNDROME OR WILLIAMS SYNDROME 
Angela E. John 
April 11, 2011 
The present project examined the regulatory function of social referencing in two 
neurodevelopmental disorders that have been well defined genetically and are 
characterized by differing patterns of socio-cognitive development: Down syndrome 
(DS) and Williams syndrome (WS). In addition, since the social referencing process 
requires children to coordinate three fundamental abilities (initiation of joint attention, 
gaze following, emotional responsivity), the present project also included three follow-up 
studies which examined these abilities separately. 
Participants were 21 children with DS (M age = 4.97 years; SD = .74) and 21 
children with WS (M age = 4.92 years; SD = .76) closely matched on age and gender. 
The results of the Social Referencing task indicated that the majority of children in both 
diagnostic groups formed positive opinions about the ambiguous stimulus when the adult 
communicated a joyful nonverbal message but had difficulty using the adult's expression 
of fear to regulate their behavior in response to the ambiguous stimulus. Children with 
DS were more likely than were children with WS to shift gaze between the adult and the 
ambiguous stimulus. However, the children with DS frequently formed a positive opinion 
of the fearful stimulus and were more likely than were the children with WS to touch the 
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stimulus. When the adult reacted fearfully to the ambiguous stimulus, the longest look 
directed to her by children with WS was significantly longer than the longest look 
directed by children with DS. In addition, children with WS were less likely to form an 
opinion of the fearful stimulus and more likely than children with DS to resort to 
superficially imitating the adult's display as opposed to using the adult's opinion of the 
stimulus to form their own. 
The results of the follow-up studies demonstrated that children with DS were 
more likely than were children with WS to initiate joint attention with the adult and to 
respond to joint attention in triadic situations. In addition, in a situation with a reduced 
attentional demand on the child than that used in the Social Referencing task, results 
indicated that the majority of children in both groups formed a positive opinion of the 
stimulus when the adult communicated a joyful message about it. However, when the 
adult communicated a fearful message, only one child in each group formed a negative 
opinion of the stimulus. 
In summary, the results indicate that there are both similarities and differences in 
the problems encountered by children with DS and children with WS in the social 
referencing process. Both groups had difficulty interpreting the communicative 
significance of fearful reactions. However, children with DS were more successful than 
children with WS both at coordinating attention in triadic interactions and at identifying 
the source of the adult's interest. Furthermore, despite demonstrating poorer overall 
intellectual ability and more limited verbal ability, children with DS evidenced better 
executive functioning than did children with WS. This difference in executive 
functioning may contribute to some of the advantages shown by children with DS. 
Vll 
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One of the key challenges influencing children's ability to cope with life demands 
involves understanding and navigating the surrounding world of people. Over the course 
of development, children learn that actions produced by people differ from actions 
produced by objects. That is, children learn to make sense ofa person's actions in terms 
of his or her underlying mental states (e.g., how a person thinks, perceives, infers, feels). 
The ability to interpret a person's actions in terms of his or her underlying mental state 
involves a complex interweaving of cognitive, affective, and personality factors. The 
ability to predict, explain, and manipulate people's actions is important for psychological 
growth and effective functioning within the environment as it facilitates children's 
learning about the world around them and about themselves (Hala, 1997). 
Consider the situation in which a young child encounters a novel object. The child 
has no information regarding this new object; as such he or she turns to his or her mother 
and sees that she is smiling while shifting her attention between the child and the object. 
The child is able to interpret these behaviors as an indication that it is safe to approach 
and explore the object. This socially guided method oflearning, referred to as the social 
referencing process, is one of the most important ways children are socialized into their 
environment (Feinman, 1982). Specifically, the social referencing process refers to an 
interactive social situation in which one person uses another person's interpretation of a 
situation to form his or her own understanding of that situation (Campos & Stenberg, 
1981; Feinman, 1982; Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda, 1983; Moore & 
Corkum, 1994). The study of the social referencing process allows cognition and learning 
to be examined in the context of a social and interactive environment and provides 
researchers with a tool for examining how children use other people to learn about the 
world around them (Feinman, 1982). While there is some research indicating that the 
onset of the social referencing process is delayed in children with developmental delays 
(Dissanayake & Crossley, 1996; Sigman, Kasari, Kwon, & Yirmiya, 1992; Warreyn, 
Roeyers, & De Groote, 2005), few ofthese studies used a standard social referencing 
paradigm or focused on specific neurodevelopmental disorders, especially genetic 
syndromes. 
Advances made in the area of scientific technology and methodological 
procedures have led to the discovery of a large number of underlying chromosomal or 
genetic anomalies resulting in intellectual disability (e.g., Down syndrome, fragile X 
syndrome, Williams syndrome). Furthermore, researchers now know that many ofthese 
syndromes, as a result of differing genotypes, are associated with specific patterns of 
behavioral characteristics, referred to as behavioral phenotypes (Hodapp & Dykens, 
200 I). Despite these advances, very little is known about the differential impact of these 
behavioral phenotypes on children's socio-cognitive development and about how socio-
cognitive development affects later outcome. A syndrome-specific approach to the 
examination of the social referencing process offers the opportunity to begin to consider 
the influence of specific syndromes on abilities fundamental to the development of social 
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cognition, providing information on genetic or other mechanisms associated with socio-
cognitive abilities. 
The purpose of this project is to provide the first set of studies directly focused on 
the regulatory function of social referencing in two neurodevelopmental disorders that 
have been well defined genetically and are characterized by differing patterns of socio-
cognitive development: Down syndrome (DS) and Williams syndrome (WS). In the 
remainder of the introduction I review four sets of literature that provide background for 
this project: the social referencing process in typically-developing (TD) children, the 
social referencing process in children with developmental delay (DD), an overview of the 
behavioral phenotypes associated with DS and WS, and finally characteristics of the DS 
and WS socio-communicative phenotypes relevant to the abilities that are fundamental to 
the social referencing process (initiating joint attention, gaze following, and emotional 
responsiveness/emotion recognition). 
Social Referencing by Typically Developing Children 
Understanding how infants make sense of the world around them has long held 
the interest of researchers. However, it was only in the late 1970s that young children's 
cognition and learning was considered within the context of the surrounding social 
environment (Feinman, 1992a). The climate of this new zeitgeist sparked interest in 
determining if children are influenced by the people around them as they learn about their 
environment. One topic of specific interest involved determining if infants use others' 
interpretations of situations when formulating their own interpretations; that is, if infants 
are able to access the regulatory function of social referencing (Feinman, 1982, 1991; 
Feinman, Roberts, Hsieh, Sawyer, & Swanson, 1992). Since the early 1980s, a number of 
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studies have been conducted focused on answering this question. While there has been 
considerable variation in the methodological approaches used to examine the regulatory 
function of social referencing, four elemental components are consistently addressed: the 
child (the person being influenced), the referee (the person providing the message), the 
referent (the topic of the message), and the message itself (the manipulation used to 
influence the child; Feinman et aI., 1992). Manipulating each of these components has 
allowed a clearer understanding of the circumstances in which children will use another 
person's interpretation of a situation to guide their own behavior. In the next few sections, 
I present the overall findings of the studies examining the regulatory function of social 
referencing by TD children (see Table 1 for review) as a function of each of these 
elements to demonstrate what is known about their role in the social referencing process. 
Before presenting these findings, I explain the organization of Table 1 to aid in 
interpretation. 
In Table 1, I present specific information from the studies that have been 
conducted to examine the regulatory function of social referencing by TD children. For 
each study I include information, if available, regarding: who the children within the 
study were [the chronological age (CA) of the participants and the sample size; column 
2], whether or not the experimental manipulation required the child to initiate a look to 
the referee in order for the message to be communicated (column 3), who the referee was 
(column 4), what the referent was (column 5), what type of emotional reaction was 
communicated in the message, whether a between-subjects or within-subjects design was 
used (column 6), and what the results of the study were (column 7). In addition, 
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information regarding the findings relating to four specific variables is presented in the 
Results (column 7): 
1. Ref: the likelihood that the child referenced the referee 
2. Prox A: the child's proximity to the adult (referee) 
3. Prox R: the child's proximity to the referent 
4. Affect: the likelihood that the child displayed positive affect. 
I also indicate the significant differences reported between message conditions [Joy = J, 
Neutral = N, Fear = F, Inattentive (referee's face not visible) = I] or participant groups for 
these four specific variables. For example, if a study found that the participants were 
significantly more likely to reference the adult (referee) in the Joy condition as compared 
to the Fear condition, that finding would be reported as follows in the Results column: 
'Ref: J > N.' 
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Table 1 
Summary of Empirical Research on Social Referencin~ by Typically Developin~ Children 
Study CA Message/Emotional Referee Referent Message/ Results 
(mos) display provided only if Emotional 
andn child established eye Display 
contact? (within or 
between 
subiect design) 
Feinman & Lewis 10 No Mother Stranger loy Ref: no info 
( 1984) n = 87 Neutral Prox A: no info 
(between) Prox R: 1 < Na 
Affect: 1 > Na 
Dickstein et al. 19 No Mother Stranger Neutral Ref: N > 1 
(1984) n =43 loy ProxA: N <1 
(within) Prox R: no info 
Affect: no info 
0\ 
Gunnar & Stone 12 - 13 No Mother Novel loy Ref: no info 
(1984) n=40 Toy Neutral Prox A: no info 
(within) Prox R: no info 
Affect: 1 > Nb 
Sorce et al. (1985) 12 Yes Mother Visual loy Crossed: 1 > F 
n=40 Cliff Fear Ref: no info 
(between) Prox A: no info 
Prox R: 1 < F 
Affect: 1 > Fe 
Zarbatany & Lamb 13 - 15 No Mothervs. Toy loy Ref: F> 1 
(l985)d n = 36 Stranger Spider Fear Prox A: no info 
(between) Prox R: 1 = F 
Affect: no info 
Klinnert et al. (1986) 12 - 18 Yes Familiar Novel loy Ref: 83% referenced 
n= 72 Adult Toys Fear ProxA: F <1 
(between) Prox R: l<F 
Affect: 1> F 
Table I (continued) 
Summary of Empirical Research on Social Referencing by Typically Developing Children 
Study CA Message/Emotional Referee Referent Message/ Results 
(mos) display provided only if Emotional 
andn child established eye Display 
contact? (within or 
between 
subject design) 
Hornik et al. (1987t 12 No Mother 2 semi- Joy Ref: no info 
n=48 familiar Neutral Prox A: Disgust < J 
toys; 1 Disgust Prox R: (J = N) < Disgust 
novel toy (between) Affect: (J = N) > Disgust 
Hornik & Gunnar 12 Yes Mother Caged Joy Ref: wary children> bold 
-....J (1988)[ n = 16 rabbit (within) children 
Prox A: no info 
18 Prox R: both groups increased 
n = 32 proximity when mom came 
over. 
Affect: wary children < bold 
children 
Walden & Ogan 6-9 Yes Parent Novel Joy Ref: 6 - 9 mos: J > F 
(1988) n = 11 Stimuli Fear 10- 13 mos: J = F 
(within) 14 - 22 mos: J < F 
10-13 Prox A: no info 
n = 15 Prox R: 6 - 9 mos: J = F 
10- 13 mos: J < F 
14 -20 14 - 22 mos: J = P 
'------ . -- - - . 
n = 14 ... 
----- --
Affect: no info 
Table 1 (continued) 
Summary of Empirical Research on Social Referencin~ by Typically Developin~ Children 
Study CA Message/Emotional Referee Referent Message/ Results 
(mos) display provided only if Emotional 
andn child established eye Display 
contact? (within or 
between 
subject design) 
Walden & Baxter 6-40 Yes Parent Novel Joy Ref: 6 - 12 mos: J > F 
(1989) n=48 Stimuli Fear 13 - 23 mos: J < F 
(between) 24 -40 mos: J = Fh 
Prox A: no info 
Prox R: J < F 
Affect: 6 - 12 mos: J = F 
13 - 23 mos: J = F 
00 24 - 40 mos: J > F 
Hirshberg & Svejda 12 No Mother Novel Joy Ref: J < F 
(1990) n=74 Father Stimuli Fear ProxA: J <F 
Both ProxR: J <F 
(between) Affect: J > F 
Camras & Sachs 10 - 19 No Familiar Novel Joy Ref: J = F 
(1991) n = 36 adult Stimuli Fear Prox A: no info 
(within) ProxR: J < F 
Affect: no info 
Rosen et al. (1992) 12 Yes Mother Novel Joy Ref: J=F 
n = 37 Stimuli Fear Prox A: Girls: F < J 
(within) Boys: J = F 
Prox R: Girls: J < F 
Boys: J = F 
Affect: Girls: J > F 
Boys: J > F 
Table 1 (continued) 
Summary of Empirical Research on Social Referencing by Typically Developing Children 
Study CA Message/Emotional Referee Referent Message/ Results 
(mos) display provided only if Emotional 
andn child established eye Display 
contact? (within or 
between 
subject design) 
Mumme et al. (1996) 12 -13 No Mother Novel Vocal: Vocal-
n=90 Stimuli Joy Ref: N = J; N < F 
Neutral Prox A: N = J; N = F 
Fear Prox R: N = J; N < F 
Affect: N = J; N < F 
Facial: Facial-
Joy Ref: 
Neutral Girls: (N = J) < F; 
\0 Fear Boys: N =J =F 
Prox A: no info 
(between) Prox R: 
Girls: (N = J) < F 
Boys: N =J=F 
Affect: N = J = F 
Stenberg (2003) 12 No Mother Novel Joy Ref: J = I; I < F 
n = 96 Stimuli Inattentive Prox A: J > I; I > I 
Fear Prox R: J < I; F < I 
(between) Affect: J = I; F = I 
Vaish & Striano 11 - 12 No Mother Visual Positive Ref: Fa=Vo; 
(2004) n =45 Cliff (Face, Face + Fa = Fa+Vo 
Voice, Voice) Fa+Vo> Vo 
Crossing Time: 
(between) (F+V = V) < F 
Prox A: no info 
Prox R: no info 
Affect: no info 
...... 
o 
Table I (continued) 
Summary of Empirical Research on Social ReferencinR by Typically DevelopinR Children 
Study CA Message/Emotional Referee I Referent 
Walden&Kim 
(2005) 
de Rosnay et al. 
(2006) 
(mos) display provided only if 
and n child established eye 
18 -24 
n = 61 























Ref: F > J; stranger> mom; 
older children referenced more 
than younger children 
Prox A: no irifo 
Pro x R: no info 
Affect: no info 
Ref: Anxious> Non-Anxious 
Prox A: no info 
Prox R: Anxious> Non-
(within) Anxious 
Fear: Anxious> Non-Anxious 
J = Joy; N = Neutral; F = Fear; I = Inattentive; Fa = Face; Vo = Vocal; Ref = References the Referee; Prox A = Proximity to Adult; Prox R = 
Proximity to Toy/StimuluslEvent; n = sample size; CA = chronological age; mos = months 
• Children were significantly more likely to regulate their behavior in response to their mother's message when she spoke directly to them, 
but not when the child only observed the mother interacting with the stranger. In addition, Easy temperament infants were more likely to 
regulate their behavior as a function of the message in comparison to Difficult temperament infants when mothers spoke directly to the child. 
b3 toys were presented: 2 familiar and I ambiguous. The effect only held for the ambiguous toy. 
~one of the infants crossed the 3Y:z foot cliff. 14/19 infants crossed a 12-inch cliff in positive condition; none crossed either cliff in fear 
condition. 
d A between-subjects design. Thirty-four infants had to be excluded due to fear of the spider prior to emotional display, resulting in -10 
participants in each group. Although the results did not reach conventional significance levels, the authors still interpreted their findings to 
indicate that children were regulating their behavior as a function of message (p < .10). 
"All toys were covered with plastic bugs to aid the mother in producing a disgust response and increase the ambiguity of the object. Mothers 
often gave children directed commands (Le., don't touch) even though they were instructed not to. No difference was found between using 
mother vs. familiar adult as referee. 
fInfants were classified as Bold vs. Wary based on initial behavior. 
gAuthors report children from 13 - 22 months of age appeared to understand the adult's communication. In the Fear condition, children 
appeared to be trying to convince the parent that the object was not scary. 
hChildren 24 and 40 months looked more in both conditions than did the younger children. 
The Child 
As indicated in Table 1 (column 2), studies of the social referencing process in 
TD children have considered the behavior of children as young as 6 months of age and as 
old as 40 months of age. Most researchers have focused on children between 9 and 14 
months of age. Results of these studies have indicated that, beginning at around 12 
months of age, children will change their proximity to both the referent and the referee 
(the adult), their affective responses, and their referencing or looking behavior in 
response to another person's appraisal of the situation (e.g., Dickstein et aI., 1984; 
Feinman & Lewis, 1984; Klinnert et aI., 1986; Walden & Ogan, 1988). 
The Referee 
When researchers first became interested in examining the regulatory function of 
social referencing, it was hypothesized that infants would be selectively more receptive to 
some referees in comparison to others. However, there was some disagreement as to what 
factors influenced an infant's receptivity. While some researchers theorized that infants 
would be more receptive to messages given by referees perceived to be credible, 
knowledgeable, or powerful (e.g., Bandura, 1969; Feinman, 1982), others took a more 
restrictive position, theorizing that social referencing was a process that occurred 
specifically between infants and their mothers and therefore arguing for a strong relation 
between attachment and referencing (e.g., Campos & Stenberg, 1981). By examining the 
results of the studies described in Table 1 as a function of the referee (column 4), we see 
that while there is some evidence that infants are more receptive to their mother's 
messages in comparison to strangers' (e.g., Feiring, Lewis, & Starr, 1984; Zarbatany & 
Lamb, 1985), several investigations have found that when infants encountered a novel 
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object/event with their mothers present (and appearing either non-communicative or 
puzzled) and received an emotional message regarding the referent from an unfamiliar 
experimenter, infants used the experimenter's message to regulate their own behavior 
toward the object. Children were more likely to approach the referent in the Joy condition 
and were more likely to avoid the referent in the Fear condition (e.g., Feinman et aI., 
1992; Klinnert et aI., 1986; Walden & Kim, 2005). Taken together, it seems that while 
infants may be selectively more receptive to guidance from a caregiver, other people 
perceived to be knowledgeable about the surrounding environment are able to regulate 
infants' behavior if the mother is non-communicative, puzzled, or not available (Feinman 
et aI., 1992). 
The Referent 
Considerable variation is observed in the choice of referent across studies 
examining social referencing (Table 1, column 5). Referents used have included strangers 
(de Rosnay et aI., 2006; Dickstein et aI., 1984; Feinman & Lewis, 1983), novel objects 
(Camras & Sachs, 1991; Hirshberg & Svejda, 1990; Klinnert et aI., 1986; Mumme et aI., 
1996; Rosen, 1988; Stenberg, 2003; Walden & Baxter, 1989; Walden & Kim, 2005; 
Walden & Ogan, 1988), semi-familiar objects (Hornik et aI., 1987), visual cliffs (Sorce et 
aI., 1985; Vaish & Striano, 2004), toy spiders (Zarbatany & Lamb, 1985), and live 
animals (Hornik & Gunnar, 1988). An examination of the results of these studies as a 
function of referent indicates that the ambiguity of the referent seems to be a vital factor 
in children's use of another person's appraisal of the situation. Children seem far more 
likely to use another person's appraisal to guide their own behavior in ambiguous 
situations (e.g., Camras & Sachs, 1991; de Rosnay et aI., 2006; Hirshberg & Svejda, 
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1990; Klinnert et aI., 1986). When children are presented with a referent with which they 
have some experience, or opinions on, they seem more resistant to another person's 
appraisal ofthe situation when it differs from their own (e.g., de Rosnay et aI., 2006; 
Feinman, 1992b; Mumme et aI., 1996; Rosen et aI., 1992; Walden & Baxter, 1989; 
Walden & Ogan, 1988; Zarbatany & Lamb, 1985). For example, as reported by Hornik 
and Gunner (1988), if a child is shown a live rabbit and is immediately fearful of the 
rabbit, the child's opinion of the rabbit does not seem to be changed by the experimenter's 
display of joy. 
The Message 
Finally, the most important element in studies examining the social referencing 
process is arguably the message itself (Table 1, column 6). Most commonly, researchers 
have used experimental designs that evaluate the impact of referencing messages by 
contrasting the impact of positive and negative messages (Boccia & Campos, 1989; 
Klinnert et aI., 1986; Sorce et aI., 1985). Some researchers have also examined the 
differential impact of neutral messages in comparison to positive or negative messages 
(e.g., Feinman & Lewis, 1984; Gunnar & Stone, 1984; Klinnert et aI., 1986). While 
positive messages have consistently been provided through expressions of joy, the 
negative message conditions used in studies examining social referencing have included 
demonstrations of fear (e.g., Klinnert et aI., 1986; Sorce et aI., 1985; Walden & Ogan, 
1988), disgust (Hornik & Gunnar, 1988), and anxiety (de Rosnay et aI., 2006). The 
results of these studies consistently document that when provided with a positive 
message, children are more likely to venture farther away from the adult, approach the 
novel/ambiguous object, and demonstrate more positive affect. In contrast, when 
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provided with a negative message children tend to stay closer to the adult, stay farther 
away from the object, and display more negative affect themselves (e.g., Camras & 
Sachs, 1991; Hirshberg & Svejda, 1990; Klinnert et aI., 1986; Mumme et aI., 1996; Sorce 
et aI., 1985; Walden & Baxter, 1989; Walden & Kim, 2005; Walden & Ogan, 1988). 
While results of these studies provide consistent evidence that infants change their 
behavior within a situation depending on whether another person's interpretation of the 
situation is positive or negative, it is important to evaluate the manner in which the 
message was provided to obtain a thorough understanding of the social referencing 
process. For example, did the infant have to request information from the adult regarding 
the novel/ambiguous object or was the message provided automatically (Table 1 column 
3; yes indicates that the child had to make eye contact with the referee to receive the 
message, no indicates that the message was provided automatically)? Examining this 
design manipulation across studies, once again there is evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that children change their behavior toward a novel/ambiguous object 
depending upon the reactions of those around them both in studies where a message was 
provided automatically (e.g., Camras & Sachs, 1991; de Rosnay et aI., 2006; Hirshberg & 
Svejda, 1990; Hornik et aI., 1987) and in studies requiring the child to look to the adult to 
obtain the message (e.g., Klinnert et aI., 1986; Sorce et aI., 1985; Walden & Baxter, 
1989; Walden & Kim, 2005; Walden & Ogan, 1988). This evidence suggests that TD 
children are not only responsive to messages, but also that they spontaneously seek 
information regarding these novel/ambiguous stimuli and events. 
Finally, it is important to consider the channel(s) through which the message was 
provided. That is, was the message provided through a single channel (e.g., facial affect 
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only, vocal affect only) or through multiple channels? While most of the early studies 
used single-channel messages, primarily facial affect, more recently the use of multiple-
channel messages including facial affect, vocal affect, and behavior has been more 
common. As discussed by Emde (1992), a multi-channel message is more indicative of 
the types of messages that children are likely to encounter in the real world and may be 
more likely to influence children's behavior (e.g., Vaish & Striano, 2004). This is an 
important manipulation to consider as it changes the ways in which children are able to 
obtain the information provided. For example, a single-channel approach using facial 
affect requires that the child look at the adult's face to receive the message. Using a 
multiple-channel approach, in situations in which the message is provided automatically 
the vocal affective information may cue the child to look to the adult. While TD children 
consistently looked to the adult in all of the studies discussed above, it is important to 
consider the implications of channel selection when interpreting data regarding the 
regulatory function of social referencing, especially when working with children with 
developmental disabilities, who often display abnormalities in their use of eye gaze. 
Summary and Discussion 
Overall, the results of this line of research demonstrate the influence of other 
people on how children make sense of their environment. There is consistent evidence 
that beginning around 12 months of age children are more likely to approach ambiguous 
stimuli/events after receiving positive messages from those around them in comparison to 
after receiving neutral or negative messages. It is important to note that successful 
performance in a standard social referencing paradigm requires the child to demonstrate 
and coordinate three fundamental abilities. First, the child must coordinate his or her 
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attention between objects and the adult in a social context. That is, the child must initiate 
joint attention. The ability to initiate joint attention is important to the social referencing 
process, as the child must shift his or her attention from the referent to the referee in order 
to gain access to the message (referee's reaction.) Secondly, once the child notices the 
adult's reaction, the child must be able to identify the focus of the adult's attention. In 
order to do so, the child must be able to follow the adult's gaze to determine the referent 
of interest. Finally, in order for the child to regulate his or her own behavior in response 
to the experimenter's reaction, the child must demonstrate the ability to comprehend the 
significance of the adult's emotionally valenced message and use this information as a 
source of information. 
It is vital to consider these fundamental abilities (initiation of joint attention, gaze 
following, and emotional responsivity/emotion recognition) when studying the social 
referencing process by children who have syndromes associated with developmental 
delay, such as DS or WS, as impairment in one or more of these fundamental abilities 
could in tum affect performance on a social referencing task. As described in the 
remaining sections of this chapter, different syndromes are associated with differing 
behavioral phenotypes. While it is important to determine if children use the people 
around them to learn about stimuli within their environments, it is also important to 
consider which, if any, of the fundamental abilities is impaired or delayed, as this will 
likely influence the children's behavioral responses during the social referencing process. 
Social Referencing by Children with Developmental Delay 
To date there have been only a few studies reported that examine the social 
referencing process in children with D D. Walden, Kneips, and Baxter (1991) examined 
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the behavioral responses of children with DD aged 15 - 54 months and mental age (MA)-
matched TD children (age range: 6 - 27 months) when presented with two ambiguous 
toys paired with either a positive verbal response (i.e., "Oh look at that! What a nice toy! 
Nice Toy!") or a negative verbal response (i.e., "Oh, look at that! What a scary toy! 
Ooooh scary toy!"). Results indicated that the MA-matched TD children were 
significantly more likely to touch the toy and touched the toy sooner in the positive 
verbal response condition in comparison to the negative verbal response condition. In 
contrast, the likelihood of touching the toy and the latency to the child's touch did not 
differ significantly between the positive verbal response condition and the negative 
verbal response conditions for the children with DD. 
Other studies have looked at the social referencing process in children with 
particular developmental disorders. For example, social referencing deficits have often 
been argued to be extremely characteristic of the autism spectrum phenotype (e.g., 
Bacon, Fein, Morris, Waterhouse, & Allen, 1998; Robins, Fein, Barton, & Green, 2001; 
Sigman, Arbelle, & Dissanayake, 1995). However, findings from studies examining the 
social referencing process in children with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) have been 
inconsistent. These inconsistencies are likely due to differences between studies in both 
the operational definitions of social referencing and the methodological approach used. 
As part of a larger study conducted to examine the responses of children with 
autism to the distress of others, Bacon and colleagues (1998) examined children's 
behavioral response to an unfamiliar stimulus, in this case an "animal-like honking-
braying sound emitted from a speaker in the room (p. 133)". All groups were matched for 
CA; in addition, pairs of groups of children with disabilities were matched for nonverbal 
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ratio IQ (nonverbal MAlCA*100) computed based on the Pattern Analysis and Copying 
subscales of the Stanford-Binet 4th edition (Thorndike, Hagen, & Sattler, 1986). The four 
groups were: a group of high functioning children with autism (NVIQ > 80, n = 32, mean 
CA = 55.84 months) matched to a group of children with developmental language 
disorder (DLD; n = 42, mean CA = 55.85) for CA and nonverbal ratio IQ, a group of 
lower functioning children with autism (NVIQ < 80; n = 51, mean CA = 62.04) matched 
to a group of children with DD (n = 39; mean CA = 55.85) on CA and nonverbal ratio IQ 
score, and a group ofTD children (n = 29; mean CA = 55.72) matched to the groups of 
children with disabilities for CA. The authors found that children in the autism groups 
looked significantly less than the TD children to the adult in response to the animal-like 
sound and argued that this finding demonstrated impairment in social referencing. This 
was the only behavioral feature on which both autism groups demonstrated comparable 
performance. Bacon and colleagues hypothesized that the observed deficit potentially 
relates to the core social deficit that characterizes individuals with autism, regardless of 
ability level. 
More recently, Wetherby, Watt, Morgan, and Shumway (2007) examined social 
communication profiles of 2-year-old children with ASD (n = 50), children with DD (n = 
23), and TD children (n = 50) on the Communication and Symbolic Behavior Scales -
First normed edition - Behavior Sample (CSBS; Wetherby & Prizant, 1993), a play based 
task designed to press for various communicative abilities. Participants in all groups were 
matched on CA, parental education, and maternal age. The ASD and DD groups were 
further matched on nonverbal (NV) developmental quotient calculated by averaging the 
age-equivalent scores from the Fine Motor and Visual Reception scales from the Mullen 
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Scales of Early Learning (MSEL; Mullen, 1995). It is important to note that, within this 
study, children assigned to the ASD group had either a diagnosis of Autistic Disorder or 
Pervasive Developmental Disorder - Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS), a milder 
condition on the autism spectrum. No information was available regarding the number of 
children in each of these diagnostic groups. The results indicated that the children with 
ASD had considerable difficulty with gaze shifting and sharing positive affect when 
compared to both children with DD and TD children. These findings were interpreted to 
reflect difficulty with social referencing as TD children actively gaze shift between 
people and objects to check if their caregiver is attending to their focus of interest 
(Bakeman & Adamson, 1984) and are able to coordinate gaze and affect sharing. 
The definition of social referencing used in these two studies focused solely on 
children's ability to look to their communicative partner when encountering 
uncertain/ambiguous situations. In both research and clinical practice, it is widely 
accepted that children with autism demonstrate a significant impairment in the use of eye 
gaze to regulate social interactions (e.g., American Psychological Association, 1996; 
Charman et aI., 1998; World Health Organization, 1996). Therefore, if only eye gaze 
shifting is coded to demonstrate social referencing, children with autism will indeed 
demonstrate deficits in social referencing. However, using this methodological approach 
tells us little about the actual regulatory function of social referencing. While the studies 
above indicate that children with ASDs demonstrate atypical behavior, or atypical eye 
gaze when seeking information, we still have no information on whether children with 
ASDs are using other modalities to seek information, can interpret affective expressions, 
or will use others to guide their approach to their environment. The methodological 
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designs used in the studies described below allow us to obtain more information 
regarding these aspects of social referencing and seem to provide some preliminary 
evidence that despite their limited use of eye contact, children with ASDs might not 
demonstrate impairments in the other abilities involved in the social referencing process 
(e.g., Campos & Stenberg, 1981; Feinman, 1982; Klinnert et aI., 1983; Moore & Corkum, 
1994). 
Sigman and colleagues (1992) examined the attention, facial affect, and 
behavioral responses of children with autism (n = 30; mean CA = 42.40 months), children 
with DD (matched on MA and CA; n = 30; mean CA = 41.67 months) and TD children 
(matched on MA; n = 30; mean CA = 19.83 months) in response to the presentation ofa 
novel object paired with expressions of fear (demonstrated through affect, gesture, and 
non-word verbalization) modeled by both the child's mother and a researcher. Though the 
children with autism looked at the adults significantly less than the control groups did and 
their approach behavior indicated that they were less hesitant than were children with 
DD, the approach behavior of the children with autism was not significantly different 
from that of the TD children. The authors also reported that when the adult demonstrated 
expressions of pleasure, once again children with autism looked at the adult less often 
than did both children with DD and TD children. No information was reported regarding 
children's responses toward the object in this condition. Sigman and colleagues 
interpreted their finding to indicate a social referencing deficit, based on the atypical 
looking behavior exhibited by the children with autism, but they did acknowledge that the 
children with autism seemed influenced by demonstrations of fear even though they were 
less likely to look at the adults. 
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Dissanayake and Crossley (1996) used a modified social referencing task to 
investigate attachment in children with autism. The child's response to a stranger entering 
a room in which the child was playing with his or her mother was recorded and compared 
to the child's behavior prior to the stranger's entrance. Participants included 16 children 
with autism (mean CA = 51.10 months), 16 CA-matched TD children (mean CA = 51.10 
months), and 16 children with DS matched as a group to the 8 verbal children with 
autism on receptive language ability (mean CA = 55.10 months). The authors found that 
when observed in free play with their mothers, the children with autism looked, smiled, 
and showed objects to their mother less frequently than did the control groups, 
demonstrating impairments in their interaction skills. Nevertheless, when the stranger 
entered the room, children in all three groups changed their behavior as they spent 
significantly more time in close proximity to their mother and spent significantly more 
time looking at and facing their mother in comparison to the stranger. The results of these 
studies, at the very least, raise the possibility that children with autism are referring to or 
evaluating the behavior of others in uncertain/ambiguous situations despite their atypical 
use of eye gaze. However, none of the studies reviewed thus far used a methodological 
approach that would allow us to evaluate the social referencing process in autism using a 
paradigm consistent with those used to study social referencing by TD children. To 
evaluate social referencing behaviors comprehensively one would need to examine 
whether the behaviors of children with autism differ in situations in which an adult 
provides positive or negative affective expressions directed toward ambiguous stimuli. 
To date, only one study has examined the behavior of children with autism in 
response to both positive and negative affective expressions. Warreyn, Roeyers, and 
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DeGroote (2005) examined the early social communicative behaviors of children from 3 
to 6 years of age with ASD (n = 20; mean CA = 58.70 months) and children with 
language or developmental delay of unknown etiology (LDIDD; n = 20; mean CA = 
62.25 months) who were individually matched on CA, IQ, and gender. Once again, the 
results raise the possibility that behavior by children with autism may be impacted by the 
affective expressions of others. In their task, an ambiguous object entered the room from 
under a black screen and mothers were asked to express an emotional reaction (happiness 
or fear) both verbally and nonverbally in response to the object. A between-subjects 
design was used such that half of the children in each group were assigned to the fear 
condition and half of the children were assigned to the happy condition. 
The children with ASD in the happy condition made more eye contact with their 
mothers than did the children with ASD in the fear condition. Furthermore, although a 
statistically significant difference was not obtained, more children with ASD in the happy 
condition approached the object and more children with ASD in the fear condition 
avoided the object. The children in the LDIDD group were found to be less avoidant of 
the ambiguous object than were the children with ASD in both conditions. However, 
when examining the behavioral responses of the LDIDD group across the two conditions, 
no statistical differences were found. On this basis, the authors hypothesized that the 
children in the LDIDD group were too old for the task and "saw through" the mother's 
expressions of fear. It is important to note that since Warreyn and colleagues used a 
between-subjects design there were only 10 children per group in each condition. This 
limited sample size clearly affected the likelihood of obtaining statistically significant 
22 
effects. It is also possible that including both children with autism and children with 
PDD-NOS in one group reduced the likelihood of finding significant effects. 
To date, there are no studies comprehensively examining the regulatory function 
of social referencing in children with DS or WS. However, two studies have been 
reported that used a social referencing paradigm to examine particular aspects of the DS 
behavioral phenotype. Kasari, Freeman, Mundy, and Sigman (1995) examined attention 
regulation by children with DS in two different situations designed to press for triadic 
interactions: (1) the Early Social Communication Scales (Mundy & Hogan, 1996), a 
semi-structured play based assessment designed to evaluate early socio-communicative 
abilities in an unambiguous context, and (2) a social referencing procedure used to 
evaluate triadic attention in an ambiguous context. Results indicated that even though the 
children with DS (n = 58; mean CA = 24.60 months; SD = 8.85) did not differ from the 
TD children matched on verbal MA (n = 23; mean CA = 14.22 months; SD = 4.40) on 
rates of joint attention during the ESCS, children with DS were less likely to demonstrate 
joint attention during the social referencing task regardless of the emotional display Goy 
or fear). Further analyses indicated that children with DS spent approximately the same 
amount of time looking at the stimulus and looking at the adult whereas the TD children 
spent considerably more time attending to the stimulus than to the adult. Kasari and 
colleagues interpret their findings to suggest that children with DS were less able to 
appraise the situation in the social referencing procedure, theorizing that they may have 
failed to make the connection between the intended emotional message and the stimulus. 
Using a similar design, Kneips, Walden, and Baxter (1994) also found that 
children with DS (n = 11; CA range: 15 - 41 months) spent more time looking at the 
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adult's face in comparison to MA-matched TD children (n = 11; CA range: 10 - 23 
months). Furthermore, the authors found that toddlers with DS were more likely than 
were MA-matched TD children to demonstrate positive affect in response to adults' 
negative emotional displays. 
So what do the findings of these studies tell us about social referencing in children 
with syndromes associated with intellectual disability (ID)? The limited evidence 
available suggests that it is likely that children with syndromes associated with ID are 
delayed in their acquisition and/or coordination of the abilities required to succeed in a 
social referencing paradigm. However, far more research directly focused on examining 
social referencing abilities in children with syndromes associated with ID is necessary. In 
addition, an examination of the underlying abilities required for successful performance 
on a social referencing paradigm is important. The results of research studies on social 
referencing in children with ASDs demonstrate that the phenotype is associated with 
specific impairments in use of gaze. As such, children with ASDs demonstrate 
abnormalities in the use of eye gaze during the social referencing tasks. However, more 
research is needed to determine if impairments are evident in other areas, as there was 
some evidence to suggest that even though children with ASDs have difficulty using eye 
gaze in social interactions they still might be using the adult's response to guide their 
behavior toward the ambiguous object. 
A better understanding of how specific aspects of a particular behavioral 
phenotype impact children's ability to use other people to learn about objects and events 
in their environment is likely to result when social referencing abilities are examined as a 
function of developmental disorder. The results of studies examining performance on 
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social referencing tasks by children with DS suggest that they also have difficulty using 
the people around them to learn about their surrounding environments. To more fully 
evaluate this hypothesis and to begin to understand what challenges are encountered by 
children with DS and children with WS during the social referencing process, it is vital 
that a comprehensive examination of social referencing be conducted including 
assessment of the fundamental abilities used during the social referencing process. 
The Behavioral Phenotypes 
Overview 
Down syndrome. DS, with a prevalence of 1 in 733 live births (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2006), is the most common genetic cause ofID. DS 
results from the presence of an extra copy of the long arm of chromosome 21. Most 
individuals with DS (~95%) have three full copies of chromosome 21 (trisomy 21). The 
remaining 5% have either a translocation (3 - 4%), in which part of a third copy of 
chromosome 21 attaches to another chromosome, or are mosaic (1 - 2%); these 
individuals have some cells with three copies of chromosome 21 and others with two 
copies (Mutton, Alberman, & Hook, 1996). While the prognosis for individuals with 
mosaic DS is not always better than for those with the other forms of DS (Carr, 2002), on 
average people with mosaic DS have higher IQs than those with trisomy 21 or 
translocation DS (FishIer & Koch, 1991). 
DS is associated with a particular pattern of dysmorphic facial characteristics, 
congenital heart defects, short stature, hypotonia, and immune system and endocrine 
system abnormalities (Korenberg et aI., 1994). Young children with DS have DD and the 
majority of older children and adults with DS have mild to moderate ID. In addition, 
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individuals with DS demonstrate a particular pattern of cognitive and linguistic strengths 
and weaknesses. The cognitive phenotype of individuals with DS typically involves 
relative strengths in nonverbal communication, motor skills, visual memory, visual motor 
integration, and visual imitation paired with relative weaknesses in auditory and verbal 
abilities (Fidler, 2005; Jarrold, Baddeley, & Hewes, 2005; Klein & Mervis, 1999; Miller 
& Leddy, 1999). When performance within the language domain is examined more 
specifically, receptive language skills are typically stronger than expressive language 
skills, and vocabulary skills are typically stronger than grammatical skills and verbal 
working memory skills (e.g., Chapman, 1999,2003; Fidler, 2005; Miller & Leddy, 1999). 
Despite significant expressive language difficulties, individuals with DS 
demonstrate a relative strength in socio-communicative abilities that may be used to 
compensate for limitations in other areas (Kasari & Freeman, 2002; Pitcairn & Wishart, 
1994). Individuals with DS are frequently described as having charming personalities 
(Gibbs & Thorpe, 1983; Rodgers, 1987; Wishart & Johnston, 1990), as being affectionate 
and loveable, and as getting along well with others (Carr, 1995). Young children with DS 
also have been found to smile more than do children with DD of mixed etiology matched 
on CA (Fidler, Barrett, & Most, 2005; Kasari, Mundy, Yirmiya, & Sigman, 1990; Knieps 
et aI., 1994). Individuals with DS also demonstrate a relative strength in forming 
relationships with others. Freeman and Kasari (2002) found that the majority of children 
with DS in their sample (mean CA = 8.37 years) had relationships with peers that met 
criteria for true friendships (reciprocal nomination in the friendship dyad, convergence 
between parental and child nomination, and at least 6 months stability of the friendship). 
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Despite these positive depictions regarding the social ability of children with DS, 
some difficulties in social functioning have been noted as well. Fidler, Barrett, and Most 
(2005) found that adolescents and young adults with DS smiled less, showed less 
attention seeking behavior and evidenced increased anxiety/depression relative to 
younger individuals with DS. Similarly, toddlers and older children with DS are often 
described as demonstrating sudden changes in mood, being stubborn, or withdrawing 
from situations when frustrated (e.g., Jahromi, Gulsrud, & Kasari, 2008; Pueschel, 
Bernier, & Pezzullo, 1991). Furthermore, researchers have theorized that traits such as 
stubbornness and strong-willed behavior resulting in task refusal may be contributing to 
inconsistent performance on tasks examining motivation and persistence (Carr, 1995; 
Fidler, 2005). Difficulties recognizing facial expressions have also been documented in 
individuals with DS (Porter, 2008; Porter, Coltheart, & Langdon, 2007). 
Williams syndrome. WS is a less common neurodevelopmental disorder resulting 
from a hemideletion of ~25 genes on chromosome 7q 11.23 (Ewart et aI., 1993; Morris, 
2006). The prevalence of WS is estimated to be 1 in 7500 live births (Stmmme, 
Bjornstad, & Ramstad, 2002). Most individuals with WS (~95%) have the same set of 
genes deleted ("classic deletion"). 
WS is characterized by mild to moderate ID or learning difficulties, dysmorphic 
facial features, heart disease (especially supravalvar aortic stenosis), connective tissue 
abnormalities, and failure to thrive or growth deficiency (Morris, 2006). Considerable 
heterogeneity is observed in the cognitive and linguistic abilities demonstrated by 
individuals with WS. WS is associated with a specific cognitive profile characterized by 
relative strengths in verbal short-term memory and the concrete vocabulary component of 
27 
language accompanied by a severe weakness in visuospatial construction (Jarrold, 
Baddeley, & Hewes, 1998; Mervis & Klein-Tasman, 2000; Mervis & Morris, 2007; 
Mervis et aI., 2000; Udwin & Yule, 1991). Within language, the greatest strength is in 
concrete vocabulary and the greatest weakness is in relational vocabulary (Mervis & 
Becerra, 2007; Mervis & John, 2008, 2010, in press). 
Individuals with WS are often described as demonstrating an excessive interest in 
others and a distinct lack of inhibition with regard to approaching others in social 
contexts (Jones et aI., 2000). As a group, children with WS are often described as being 
gregarious and overly friendly (Gosch & Pankau, 1997), highly sociable (Dilts, Morris, & 
Leonard, 1990), charming (Fryns, Borghgraef, Volcke, & van den Berge, 1991), and 
never going unnoticed in a group (Dykens & Rosner, 1999). Despite these seemingly 
positive characteristics, children with WS demonstrate significant difficulty with peer 
relationships (Davies, Udwin, & Howlin, 1998; Sullivan, Winner, & Tager-Flusberg, 
2003), high levels of tension and sensitivity (Klein-Tasman & Mervis, 2003), and 
impairments in pragmatic abilities (for review see Mervis & Becerra, 2007; Mervis & 
John, 2010; Tager-Flusberg & Plesa Skwerer, 2006). In adulthood, most individuals with 
WS demonstrate difficulty with social interactions, including establishing and 
maintaining relationships. In addition, they have high levels of anxiety and are socially 
isolated (Chemiske et aI., 2004; Davies et aI., 1998; Dykens & Rosner, 1999; Howlin & 
Udwin, 2006; Stinton, Elison, & Howlin, 2010; Udwin & Yule, 1991). 
While progress has been made with regard to understanding the behavioral 
phenotypes associated with both DS and WS; much remains to be understood. To date, 
there are no published studies specifically designed to examine the regulatory function of 
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social referencing in individuals with either DS or WS. However, there have been some 
studies of the component abilities (initiating joint attention, gaze following, and emotion 
recognition) theorized to impact successful social referencing performance. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I briefly review this literature with regard to TD children, 
children with DS, and children with WS, and then provide an overview of the studies 
included in my dissertation. 
Initiating Joint Attention 
The emergence and development of the ability to coordinate one's attention 
between a social partner and objects or events of mutual interest, known as joint 
attention, has been argued to evidence the child's recognition of people as intentional 
agents (Thompson, 2006) and mark a turning point in children's communicative 
competence (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984; Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; 
Thompson, 2006). Some researchers have argued that this integration of objects/events 
into social interactions facilitates social learning (Baldwin, 1995; Mundy & Neal, 2001), 
reflecting a sensitivity to the reward of sharing with others (Mundy, 1995; Trevarthen & 
Aitken, 2001) and serving as a precursor for the later development of understanding 
others' intentions, feelings, and thoughts (e.g., Bretherton, 1991; Tomasello, 1995). 
Initiated joint attention behaviors can be divided into two categories: (1) 
imperative joint attention (IJA) acts in which the child's behavior serves an instrumental 
function (e.g., to request) and (2) declarative joint attention (DJA) acts in which the 
behavior is intended to share awareness or enjoyment of an object or event (Charman et 
aI., 1998; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1993). TD infants begin to participate in episodes of 
joint attention with adults between 8 and 10 months of age (Saxon, Frick, & Colombo, 
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1997; Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978), and between 12 and 15 months of age joint attention 
becomes a consistent part of infant-adult interactions (Bakeman & Adamson, 1984). 
From 9 to 12 months of age TD children produce more DJA acts than IJA acts, but 
between 12 and 18 months of age TD children consistently produce more IJA acts than 
DJA acts (Mundy et aI., 2007). 
Down syndrome. Although social interaction skills are considered a relative 
strength for children with DS, difficulties in the area of joint attention have been 
documented. Toddlers with DS tend to maintain eye contact with other people much 
longer than do MA-matched and receptive language matched TD children (Berger & 
Cunningham, 1981, 1983; Kasari et aI., 1990; Lewy & Dawson, 1992). Kasari and 
colleagues (1990) found that children with DS (n = 30; mean CA = 22.9 months) were 
more likely to look at the experimenter's face, less likely to look at toys in view but out 
of reach, and more likely to look away from an interaction in comparison to MA-matched 
TD children (n = 30; mean CA = 15.2 months). Similarly, Lewy and Dawson (1992) 
found that children with DS (n = 20; mean CA = 37.00 months) spent significantly more 
time engaged solely with the adult as well as significantly more time in coordinated joint 
attention (defined as actively involved with both the person and the toy alternating 
periods of gaze between the object and the adult) than did either children with autism (n = 
20; mean CA = 50.00 months) or TD children matched for receptive language age (n = 
20; mean CA = 17.80 months). These findings, indicating that children with DS spend 
increased time attending to the people around them, have been theorized to indicate a 
deficiency in exploring and assessing the environment and provide evidence for an early 
preference for social interaction/stimuli. 
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The results of studies directly focused on examining the initiation of joint 
attention by children with DS indicate a similar pattern of preference for or increased 
attention to social interactions. For example, Mundy and colleagues (1988) examined 
social interaction skills in a sample of 30 children with DS divided into two groups: low-
MA (n = 15; mean CA = 22.9 months, mean MA = 15.6 months) and high-MA (n = 15; 
mean CA = 43 months, mean MA = 27.7 months). The social interaction skills of the two 
groups of children with DS were compared to those of two MA-matched groups ofTD 
children (low-MA group: n = 15; mean CA = 15.2 months, mean MA = 16.4 months; 
High-MA group: n = 15, mean CA = 22.6 months, mean MA = 28.1 months). The results 
of this study indicated that both groups of children with DS demonstrated more social 
interaction behaviors (e.g., initiating tum-taking, throwing toys while smiling at the 
researcher) than did the TD children but were less likely than the TD children to make 
requests. A closer examination of requesting behaviors indicated that this difficulty for 
the children with DS was limited to requesting objects or assistance with objects (triadic 
requests); children with DS were not less likely to request a physical interaction game 
(dyadic request). Similarly, Fidler and colleagues (2005) found that children with DS (n = 
16; mean CA = 34.25 months) were less likely to demonstrate IJA acts in comparison to 
MA-matched TD children (n = 19; mean CA = 18.42 months) and MA- and CA-matched 
children with mixed or nonspecific etiology DD (n = 18; mean CA = 33.94 months). No 
significant differences between the three groups were observed for DJA acts or for social 
requests. 
Williams syndrome. To date there are only a few studies examining joint attention 
in children with WS. The emergence of joint attention in WS is delayed relative to both 
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CA and language ability (Mervis & Bertrand, 1993, 1997; Mervis et aI., 2003). Children 
with WS also have been shown to be significantly less likely to engage in joint attention 
acts than MA-matched TD children or children with DS individually matched on CA, 
developmental quotient (DQ), and expressive vocabulary size (Laing et aI., 2002; Rowe, 
Peregrine, & Mervis, 2005). 
Laing et ai. (2002) examined the early communicative behaviors of 13 toddlers 
with WS (mean CA = 31 months) in comparison to 13 MA-matched TD children (mean 
CA = 13 months). Using the ESCS (Mundy & Hogan, 1996), Laing and colleagues found 
that children with WS were significantly less likely to initiate IJA acts and less likely to 
incorporate a pointing gesture into either IJA or DJA acts. Laing et ai. also noted that the 
analysis examining whether children with WS initiated DJA acts less often than controls 
approached significance (p = .07). However, the children with WS were significantly 
more likely than were the TD children to produce dyadic social interaction behaviors. 
Two other studies (Klein-Tasman, Mervis, Lord, & Phillips, 2007; Lincoln, 
Searcy, Jones, & Lord, 2007) report specific information regarding the proportion of 
children with WS of similar age (30 - 63 months vs. 27 - 58 months) who demonstrate 
joint attention using the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-Generic (ADOS-G; 
Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, & Risi, 1999), a semi-structured, play based interaction designed 
to assess difficulties characteristic of children with ASDs in the areas of communication, 
reciprocal social interaction, creativity and imagination, and the presence of restricted 
and repetitive behaviors. Both Klein-Tasman et ai. (2007) and Lincoln et ai. (2007) 
reported that approximately half (45% and 50% respectively) of their participants did not 
clearly integrate eye contact to reference an object that was out of reach with their 
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communicative partner and more than half (79% and 65%) of the participants did not 
integrate eye contact or vocalization with acts of showing objects. Lincoln et al. (2007) 
also compared the performance on the ADOS-G of children with WS to CA- and ratio 
IQ-matched children with autism. It is important to note that ratio IQ scores 
(MAlCAxl00) were calculated based on performance on the Bayley Scales ofInfant 
Development (Bayley, 1969) for the WS group and were calculated based on 
performance on the MSEL (Mullen, 1995) for the autism group. Results of this 
comparison indicated that even though more than half of the children with WS 
demonstrated difficulties with joint attention and showing, the WS group still performed 
significantly better than the autism group, as all of the children with autism demonstrated 
these types of difficulties. Klein-Tasman, Phillips, Lord, Mervis, and Gallo (2009) 
replicated this finding, also using the ADOS-G, demonstrating that children with WS (n = 
28; mean CA = 41.68 months, mean MSEL ELC = 56.29) evidenced significantly better 
joint attention skills than did children with autism (n = 28, mean CA = 41.00, mean MSEL 
ELC = 55.78) who were matched on gender, CA, and overall intellectual ability when 
controlling for receptive language ability and when controlling for expressive language 
ability. 
Comparison of Down syndrome and Williams syndrome. Only one study directly 
compared the joint attention abilities of children with DS to children with WS. Using the 
CSBS (Wetherby & Prizant, 2002), Rowe, Peregrine, and Mervis (2005) found somewhat 
different profiles when comparing 10 toddlers with WS (mean CA = 26.6 months) to 10 
toddlers with DS matched on CA, DQ, and expressive vocabulary size. The authors 
reported that children with WS were significantly less likely to initiate DJA acts or shift 
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gaze than were children with DS. The two groups did not differ on frequency ofIJA acts 
produced. Given that the DS phenotype is theorized to be associated with a specific 
deficit in IJA acts, the results of this study suggest that children with WS demonstrate 
impairments in joint attention with difficulties observed for both IJA and DJA acts. 
Taken together, the results of the studies described above indicate that both 
children with DS and children with WS demonstrate impairments in joint attention 
ability. Within triadic interactions, children with DS demonstrate more difficulty with 
regard to regulating another person's behavior for instrumental purposes (IJA acts) than 
they do with regard to either directing and focusing another person's attention on an 
object or event (DJA acts) or requesting within dyadic interactions. In comparison, 
children with WS demonstrate difficulty with both DJA and IJA acts within triadic 
interactions relative to both MA-matched TD children and CA- and MA-matched 
children with DS. Similar to children with DS, they demonstrate a relative strength in the 
ability to request in dyadic interactions. 
Gaze Following 
The ability to follow another person's gaze is an important milestone in early 
development as it is a governing factor in both social and communicative interactions 
between a young child and an adult (Adamson, 1995; D'Entremont, Hains, & Muir, 
1997). So what drives a person to tum to look in the same direction as another person? 
Most basically, it is theorized to be the desire to see what the other person is looking at, 
or the desire to share in another person's perspective (Moore, 1999). Although this is 
likely what compels adults to follow gaze, this may not be the case throughout 
development. 
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While some theorists have suggested that the ability of young children to follow 
another person's gaze indicates the understanding of intentionality (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Bretherton, 1991), other researchers have strongly cautioned against this 
interpretation, pointing out that children must be sensitive to changes in eye direction 
specifically in order to demonstrate an understanding of joint visual attention (Moore, 
1999). Whereas prior to 10 months TD children will turn their heads in response to 
another person's change in head direction, it is only around 10 months of age that TD 
children will selectively follow changes in eye gaze specifically (e.g., Brooks & Meltzoff, 
2002; Corkum & Moore, 1995). 
Down syndrome. Only a few studies have examined gaze following by children 
with DS. Leekam, Baron-Cohen, Perrett, Milders, and Brown (1997) examined gaze 
monitoring and visual perspective taking in three groups matched on receptive language 
age equivalent: children with autism (n = 12; mean CA = 11.67 years; range: 5.58-
17.42), children with DD (n = 11; mean CA = 7.58 years; range: 4.5 - 12.25 years), and 
TD children (n = 12, mean CA = 5.67 years; range: 5.5 - 5.92). Results indicated that, 
when it came to following the adult's gaze shifts, the DS group performed similarly to the 
TD group and significantly better than the autism group. Sigman and Ruskin (1999) 
similarly reported that children with DS (CA range: 2 - 8 years) were significantly more 
likely than MA-matched children with autism (CA range: 3 - 11 years) to follow another 
person's gaze. The performance of children with DS did not differ significantly from that 
of other children with DD (CA range: 2 - 6 years) or MA-matched TD children (mean 
CA = 19.49 months). While these results demonstrate that children with DS can follow 
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another person's gaze shift, participants in these studies were considerably older than the 
age at which TD children consistently follow gaze. 
Williams syndrome. Two studies (Klein-Tasman et aI., 2007; Lincoln et aI., 2007) 
reported specific information regarding the proportion of children with WS of similar age 
(30 - 62 months vs. 27 - 58 months) who followed a gazing or pointing gesture paired 
with a verbalization during the ADOS-G. Klein-Tasman et ai. (2007) found that 
approximately 34% of the children in their sample were unable to use an examiner's 
communicative gaze shift paired with the verbalization "Look" to locate a target from a 
distance. Half of these children (17% of the total sample) were still unable to locate the 
intended target even when a communicative pointing gesture was added. Lincoln et ai. 
(2007) reported that 20% of their sample had difficulty following a communicative eye-
gaze gesture accompanied by the verbalization "Look;" no information was provided 
regarding the percentage of children demonstrating difficulty using the examiner's eye 
gaze paired with a pointing gesture. In addition, Lincoln et ai. (2007) found that children 
with WS evidenced significantly better scores on the responding to joint attention item of 
the ADOS-G than did children with autism. This finding was also supported by Klein-
Tasman et ai. (2009), who found that children with WS evidenced significantly better 
scores than did gender-, CA-, and DQ-matched children with autism both when 
controlling for receptive language ability and when controlling for expressive language 
ability. 
Laing et ai. (2002) found that children with WS (n = 13; mean CA = 31 months; 
CA range: 17 - 55) followed the adult's pointing gestures (whether proximal or distal) 
less often than the MA-matched TD group (n = 13; mean CA = 13 months; 30.8% vs. 
36 
41.06% of the time respectively). However, this difference did not reach conventional 
significance levels (p = .07 vs. p < .05), perhaps due to the small sample sizes. The 
authors also reported data for a second study using 11 of the MA-matched pairs (mean 
CA: WS = 29.6 months vs. TD = 13.1 months) examining the ability to follow an adult's 
point to distal objects. Results indicated that the children with WS followed the adult's 
pointing gesture less often than the TD children did (p = .05). 
Comparison of Down syndrome and Williams syndrome. To date only two 
studies have directly compared the performance of children with DS and children with 
WS on a gaze following task. Using a semi-structured play based assessment designed to 
press for early communicative behaviors, Rowe et al. (2005) compared the performance 
of 10 pairs of children (one child with WS, one child with DS) matched on CA (range: 18 
- 26 months; p = .56), DQ (p = .76), and expressive vocabulary size (p = .36). Results 
indicated that the toddlers with DS successfully followed a distal pointing gesture 
significantly more often than did the toddlers with WS (p = .008). John and Mervis 
(20 10) examined the comprehension of the communicative intent behind pointing and 
gazing gestures by children with DS (n = 25; mean CA = 4.34 years; range: 3.02 - 5.40 
years) and children with WS (n = 33; mean CA = 4.14 years; range: 3.00 - 5.33 years). 
Results indicated that despite significantly lower MSEL DQs and MSEL receptive and 
expressive language raw scores, children with DS were significantly better at 
comprehending communicative intent. Both groups were better at comprehending 
communicative intent indicated by a pointing gesture paired with eye gaze than by eye 
gaze alone. 
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Taken together, the results of the studies described above indicate that both 
children with DS and children with WS demonstrate delay in the ability to follow another 
person's gaze. There is some evidence suggesting that children with WS have more 
difficulty following gaze than do children with DS but more research is necessary to 
evaluate this possibility fully. 
Emotion Recognition 
Emotional development is an area of study for which systematic investigation 
began only recently. The lack of prior research is likely due to both the methodological 
complexity of studying emotional development and the belief that emotions were 
secondary responses to more important underlying processes (e.g., Saami, Campos, 
Camras, & Witherington, 2006). Facial expressions of emotion are generally viewed as 
behavioral responses indicative of underlying mental states (Sorce et aI., 1985). However, 
emotional expressions are more than an index of underlying states; they also have an 
interpersonal function, regulating the behavior of other individuals. It is this interpersonal 
regulatory function of emotion that makes affective expression an important component 
of the communicative process (l-Iolodynski & Friedlmeier, 2005). Cross-cultural studies 
examining TD adult facial expressions have shown that the facial expressions indicating 
certain emotions (i.e., joy, fear, anger, sadness, surprise, and disgust) are virtually 
identical across cultures (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1971). 
Even at a young age, TD children are very attentive to others' emotions. Around 6 
months of age TD infants respond differentially to their mothers' happy and sad 
expressions (Cohn, Campbell, Matias, & Hopkins, 1990; Termine & Izard, 1988) and 
around 12 months of age infants use emotional information communicated by another 
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person to help appraise an ambiguous situation (e.g., Feinman, 1992b; Sorce et aI., 1985). 
This ability to regulate one's own behavior in response to another person's emotional 
display requires that children both be responsive to the emotional display and 
comprehend its significance. 
Down syndrome. To date, there are only a few studies of emotion recognition by 
children with DS. Kasari, Freeman, and Hughes (2001) studied emotion recognition in 4-
to 6-year-olds with DS using three different studies. Study 1 included children with DS (n 
= 20; mean CA = 76.7 months), MA-matched TD children (n = 20; mean CA = 39.65 
months), and CA-matched TD children (n = 20; mean CA = 77.90 months). Overall, 
children with DS performed significantly worse than the CA-matched TD children on 
both the emotion labeling and the emotion recognition tasks. The children in all three 
groups were more accurate at recognizing, identifying, and labeling happy expressions 
than they were at recognizing, identifying, and labeling fear expressions. 
In Study 2, Kasari and colleagues (2001) examined the emotion recognition 
ability of children with DS (n = 36, mean CA = 97.6 months), MA-matched children with 
DD of mixed etiology (n = 27; mean CA = 104.1 months), and MA-matched TD children 
(n = 33; mean CA = 43.6 months). Results from this study demonstrated that the MA-
matched TD children were significantly better at labeling 'fear' than were the children 
with DS and the children with DD. In addition, children with DS were significantly worse 
at identifying fear within a story scenario than were the children with DD and the TD 
children. Finally, the authors found that when children incorrectly identified the emotion 
'fear,' the responses of children with DS were significantly more likely to be that of 
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positively valenced emotions than were the responses of children with DD and the TD 
children. 
Williams, Wishart, Pitcairn, and Willis (2005) found that children with DS (n = 
34; mean CA = 13.33 years) performed similarly to MA-matched children with 
nonspecific ID (n = 53; mean CA = 11.83 years) but significantly worse than MA-
matched TD children (n = 39; mean CA = 4.08 years) on an emotion-matching task. The 
children with DS demonstrated significantly poorer performance on matching 
expressions of fear than did the MA-matched TD group. The error patterns for the DS 
group were more variable than for the other two groups, for whom errors were more 
consistent (e.g., surprise for fear). 
Williams syndrome. Individuals with WS also evidence difficulty matching and 
labeling emotional expressions. Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (2000) found that children 
with WS (n = 22; mean CA = 7 years 2 months) performed similarly to children with 
Prader-Willi syndrome (n = 15; mean CA = 6 years 11 months) and children with non-
specific ID (n = 11; mean CA = 7 years 7 months) on a task involving matching facial 
expressions (scared, happy, angry, and sad). All three groups were significantly better at 
recognizing scared and happy expressions than at recognizing angry and sad expressions 
(a pattern also observed in TD children and children with autism; Gross & Ballif, 1991; 
Hobson, Ouston, & Lee, 1988). 
Gagliardi et al. (2003) conducted a similar study using a wider age range for 
individuals with WS (n = 26; mean CA = 14.35 years; range: 5.6 - 32.3). Comparison 
groups were MA-matched TD children (n = 26; mean CA = 5.5 years; range: 4.3 - 11.3) 
and CA-matched TD individuals (n = 26; mean CA = 14.49 years; range: 5.8 - 29.7). All 
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participants completed an animated facial expression comprehension test. The WS group 
performed significantly worse than the CA-matched TD group but similarly to the MA-
matched TD group on both happy and fear (as well as on anger, disgust, sad). Individuals 
in all three groups were significantly better at recognizing happy expressions in 
comparison to all other emotions. Finally, Plesa-Skwerer et al. (2006) administered the 
Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal Accuracy Scale - 2nd edition (DANVA-2; Nowicki & 
Duke, 1994), a standardized measure of emotion recognition, to adolescents and adults 
with WS (n = 47; mean CA = 19.49 years; range: 12.1 - 32.4). The WS group performed 
similarly to IQ-matched participants with learning/intellectual disability (n = 49; mean 
CA = 17.88 years; range: 13.5 - 23.1) but significantly worse than CA-matched TD 
participants (n = 58; mean CA = 18.19 years; range: 12.1 - 31.8) when controlling for 
performance on the Benton Test of Facial Recognition (Benton, Hamsher, Varney, & 
Spreen, 1983) at identifying emotions in faces (WS: 75.83% correct, TD: 85.34% correct) 
and emotions in voices (WS: 60.84% correct, TD: 76.21 % correct). The WS group 
(facial; 66.13% correct, vocal: 42.19% correct) was also significantly less accurate at 
identifying both facial and vocal expressions of fear than were the CA-matched TD 
participants (facial: 84.19% correct, vocal: 73.56). All three groups were significantly 
better at recognizing happy expressions than at recognizing fear expressions. 
Comparison of Down syndrome and Williams syndrome. Porter (2008) directly 
compared the ability of individuals with DS and individuals with WS to recognize 
emotions as measured by the DANVA-2. Results indicated that, when controlling for 
MA, individuals with WS [n = 9 (8 with a genetically confirmed diagnosis); CA range: 
6.0 - 43.67 years] and individuals with DS (n = 20; CA range: 6.75 - 40.75 years) 
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demonstrated comparable performance with regard to recognizing expressions of fear. 
High mean proportions of errors for expressions of fear were observed for both groups, 
even when high intensity stimuli were used (High Intensity Stimuli: WS = .56, DS = .56; 
Low Intensity Stimuli: WS = .66, DS = .75). 
Results of these studies suggest that individuals with DS and individuals with WS 
have more difficulty recognizing fearful expressions than do their same age TD peers. 
Overall, however, very little is known about emotion recognition in individuals with DS 
or WS, especially in young children with these syndromes. In addition, the majority of 
studies examining emotion recognition used either adolescents/adults or included 
participants ranging from young children to adults in the same group making the results 
difficult to interpret. More information is necessary to evaluate emotion recognition 
ability and, in particular, to determine if young children with DS or WS recognize the 
communicative significance of emotional expressions. 
The Present Study 
An evaluation of social referencing skills in children with DS and children with 
WS will assist in developing a better understanding of the difficulties encountered by 
children with these neurodevelopmental disorders in social interactions. In addition, this 
type of study will allow us to have a better understanding of how these socio-cognitive 
and socio-communicative behavioral phenotypes influence children's ability to both 
interact with and use people as a source of information about the world around them. The 
purpose of this dissertation is two-fold: (1) To provide the first study directly focused on 
examining the ability of children with DS and children with WS to use another person as 
a source of information in ambiguous situations using a standard social referencing 
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paradigm, and (2) To examine three abilities fundamental to the social referencing 
process (initiation of joint attention, gaze following, and emotional 
responsiveness/recognition) to help provide clarifying information as to the potential 
areas of difficulty encountered within the social referencing process. 
To address these goals, I used data collected from four experimental tasks to 
begin to characterize the social referencing abilities of children with DS and children 
with WS (see Figure 1). In the first task, I used a standard social referencing paradigm 
task to assess the regulatory function of social referencing in children with DS and 
children with WS (Chapter III). As performance on the Social Referencing task requires a 
child to coordinate multiple abilities, if the child does not utilize another person as a 
source of information about this ambiguous stimulus it may be difficult to specify if and 
where the children are encountering difficulties. To obtain clarifying information as to 
where difficulties may be encountered, three additional tasks examining the fundamental 
abilities needed for social referencing were included in the present project. 
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Figure 1: Diagram of the Project Experimental Tasks 
CHAPTER III: Regulatory Function of Social Referencing: When encountering an ambiguous 
object, does the child use another person's appraisal of the object to guide his/her own behavior? 











Child uses another person's emotional appraisal of the situation 
CHAPTER VI: 
Utilizing Emotional Reactions 
There are three fundamental abilities that a child uses during the social 
referencing process. First, the child must initiate joint attention between the object and 
the adult (Chapter IV). Secondly, once the child notices the adult's reaction, the child 
must be able to identify the focus of the adult's attention. This requires that the child be 
able to follow the adult's gaze to identify the referent (Chapter V). Finally, in order for 
the child to regulate his or her own behavior in response to the adult's reaction, the child 
must demonstrate the ability to comprehend the significance of the adult's emotionally 
valenced reaction in order to use this information to guide his or her own behavior 
(Chapter VI). 
44 
Due to the prevalence rates of these neurodevelopmental disorders, a within 
subjects design was used to address my research questions. As the social referencing task 
evaluates cognition and learning in the context of a social and interactive environment, it 
was vital that the tasks used to assess the component abilities also be presented in a 
naturalistic interaction. As such, the trials/conditions from the tasks assessing component 
abilities (Chapters IV - VI) were interspersed such that they could be administered to the 
children in the context of two structured play interactions at a table. As the social 
referencing task (Chapter III) was administered on the floor, it was always administered 
either before or after the table play-interaction to limit the number of times children 
needed to be transitioned between playing at a table and playing on the floor. 
In the remaining chapters, I present the research questions, methods, results, and 
discussions for the developmental assessment (Chapter II), social referencing task 
(Chapter III), and the tasks assessing the proposed abilities vital to the process of using 
another person's appraisal of a situation to guide one's own behavior (Chapters IV - VI). 
Finally, I conclude with a general discussion of what the findings tell us as a whole and 




As discussed in Chapter I, underlying chromosomal or genetic anomalies have 
been associated with many ID syndromes (e.g., Down syndrome, fragile X syndrome, 
Williams syndrome) and specific behavioral phenotypes resulting from these differing 
genotypes have also been associated with many of these syndromes (e.g., Hodapp & 
Dykens, 2001). In addition to being associated with reduced overall intellectual ability 
and specific cognitive profiles, these syndromes involve a complex array of personality 
and motivational characteristics that profoundly affect both interactions with others and 
successful navigation of the surrounding environment (Zigler, 1971). In the present 
chapter, I compare the performance of children with DS and children with WS on two 
standardi~ed assessments, one measuring overall intellectual ability and one assessing 
executive functioning, to provide basic descriptive information about the participants. 
The following research questions were evaluated in the present chapter: 
(1) Do children with DS and children with WS differ with regard to overall 
intellectual ability? 
Previous research has demonstrated that when matched for CA, 
children with DS earn significantly lower raw scores than children with WS 
on standardized assessments of overall intellectual ability (e.g., John & 
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Mervis, 2010; Klein & Mervis, 1999; Rowe, 2007). Based on this literature I 
predicted: 
Prediction: Children with WS will demonstrate higher General 
Conceptual Ability (GCA; similar to IQ) standard scores on the 
Differential Ability Scales-II (DAS-II) than will CA-matched children 
with DS. 
(2) Are there differences in the verbal, nonverbal reasoning, and spatial abilities 
of CA-matched children with DS and children with WS? 
Previous research has demonstrated that children with DS earn 
significantly lower raw scores on tests oflanguage ability than do CA-
matched children with WS (e.g., John & Mervis, 2010; Klein & Mervis, 1999; 
Rowe, 2007). Based on this literature I predicted: 
Prediction: Children with WS will demonstrate higher DAS-II Verbal 
cluster standard scores than will CA-matched children with DS. 
(3) Do children with DS and children with WS differ with regard to overall 
executive functioning ability? 
(4) Are there differences in the inhibitory self-control, flexibility, and emergent 
metacognitive abilities of children with DS and children with WS? 
Method 
Participant Eligibility 
Children were eligible to participate in the present study if they were between 42 
and 71 months of age and had a genetically confirmed diagnosis ofDS (trisomy 21) or 
WS (classic deletion). Exclusionary criteria included: 1) presence of another genetic or 
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neurodevelopmental disorder (e.g., ASD) in addition to the diagnosis ofDS or WS or 2) 
presence of organic brain damage. 
Participants 
The two groups of children who participated in the present project were recruited 
through a study of language and cognitive development of children with 
neurodevelopmental disorders conducted by Dr. Carolyn B. Mervis at the University of 
Louisville. The DS group included 21 children (13 boys, 8 girls) aged 3.51 - 5.88 years 
(M= 4.97; SD = .74). The racial/ethnic background ofthe children in the DS group was: 
90% Caucasian and 10% mixed (more than one race/ethnicity). 
The WS group included 21 children (13 boys, 8 girls) aged 3.52 - 5.94 years (M= 
4.92; SD = .76) selected to match the DS group on CA (p = .79) and gender from a larger 
pool of children with WS who participated in the project (n = 36). Of this larger pool of 
children with WS, four children were excluded due to incomplete data on the Social 
Referencing Task presented in Chapter III (one child due to uncorrected hearing loss, two 
children due to a phobia of loud noises, and one child who demonstrated an immediate 
reaction of intense fear to the robot). From the remaining 32 children, the final WS group 
was selected by choosing the child closest in age to each child with DS and, if possible, 
who was of the same gender. The racial/ethnic constitution of the children in the final WS 
group was: 67% Caucasian, 5% African-American, 9% Asian, and 19% mixed. 
Standardized Assessments 
Differential Ability Scales - II Early Years (DAS-II; Elliott, 2007). The DAS-
H Early Years provides an assessment of general intellectual functioning for children 
aged 211 - 8 years and was designed to provide specific information about an individual's 
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strengths and weaknesses across a wide range of intellectual activities. To provide a 
description of the participants' intellectual abilities, I considered the DAS-II Early Years 
GCA (M = 100; SD = 15) and the cluster standard scores (SSs) measuring Verbal, 
Nonverbal Reasoning, and Spatial abilities (M = 100; SD = 15). 
Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Functioning-Preschool (BRIEF-
Preschool; Gioia, Espy, & Isquith, 2003). The BRIEF-Preschool is a 63-item 
questionnaire for parents of children aged 2 - 5 years regarding executive functioning 
behaviors in both home and school environments. Parents use a 3-point scale (never, 
sometimes, often) to indicate how often each item has been a problem in the past six 
months. The mean T score for children in the general population is 50, with a standard 
deviation of 10. On this measure, lower T scores indicate better executive functioning. To 
provide a description of the participants' executive functioning abilities, I considered the 
BRIEF-Preschool Global Executive Composite (GEC, M = 50; SD = 10) and the three 
index T scores measuring Inhibitory Self-Control, Flexibility, and Emergent 
Metacognition (M = 50; SD = 10). 
Procedure 
Children completed a battery of cognitive and language assessments including an 
assessment of intellectual abilities (DAS-II). Parents completed several questionnaires 
including the BRIEF-Preschool. These measures were administered according to the test 
authors' instructions and were almost always completed within a few days of each other. 
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Data Analysis 
This study focused on comparing the intellectual and executive functioning 
abilities of children with DS and children with WS. Data from the DAS-II and BRIEF-
Preschool met the necessary statistical assumptions for use of parametric analyses. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics for the DAS-II GCA and cluster SSs and the BRIEF-
Preschool GEC and index T scores are presented in Table 2. Analyses were computed to 
compare the intellectual abilities of children with DS and children with WS. It was 
predicted that children with WS would demonstrate higher DAS-II GCAs than would 
children with DS. To evaluate this prediction, a one-tailed t-test was conducted. Results 
indicated that, as predicted, the mean GCA for the WS group was significantly higher 
than the mean GCA for the DS group (1[40] = 1.76,p = .045, Cohen's d = -.54, one-tailed 
test). Follow-up t-tests were conducted on the DAS-II cluster SSs to determine the locus 
of the significant effect (two-tailed a1W= .017; one-tailed a1W= .034). It was predicted 
that children with WS would demonstrate higher DAS-II Verbal cluster SSs than would 
children with DS. To test this prediction, a one-tailed t-test was conducted. Results 
indicated that as predicted, the two diagnostic groups differed significantly as a function 
ofDAS-II Verbal cluster SS (t[40] = 2.53,p = .008, Cohen's d= -.78, one-tailed), with 
children with WS earning higher SSs than did children with DS. Comparisons for DAS-II 
Nonverbal Reasoning cluster SS (1[40] = 1.90,p = .06, Cohen's d= -.59, two-tailed) and 
DAS-II Spatial cluster SS (/[40] = 0.39,p = .70, Cohen's d= -.06, two-tailed) did not 
reach criterion for a significant difference between groups. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Performance on DAS-JJ and BRIEF-Preschool 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Measure M SD Range M SD Range 
DAS-II (SSs) 
Verbal cluster 68.00 10.72 51 - 91 76.90 12.05 51 - 95 
Nonverbal Reasoning 76.95 14.13 36 - 97 84.38 10.97 63 - 107 
cluster 
Spatial cluster 51.19 11.72 34 -70 52.76 14.05 34 - 82 
GCA 59.19 10.49 37 -73 65.05 11.03 44 - 81 
BRIEF-Preschool (Ts) 
Inhibitory Self-Control 53.76 12.19 34 - 88 64.76 9.73 38 - 83 
Flexibility 49.25+ 8.48 36 - 71 56.71 6.45 37 - 66 
Emergent 65.67 13.28 38 - 92 77.52 10.83 44 - 93 
Metacognition 
Global Executive 59.57 12.87 35 - 73 71.85+ 6.29 60 - 85 
Composite 
+T score for one child was excluded, as it was an extreme score (more than 3 box 
lengths from either the upper or the lower edge of the box plot) 
To compare the overall executive functioning abilities of children with DS and 
children with WS, an independent samples t-test was computed. Results indicated that the 
mean Global Executive Composite T score for the children with DS was significantly 
lower, indicating better overall executive functioning abilities, than the mean for the 
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children with WS (t[38] = 3.85,p < .001, Cohen's d= 1.20). Follow-up I-tests were 
conducted on the BRIEF-Preschool index T scores to determine the locus of the 
significant effect (two-tailed afw = .017). Results indicated that as predicted, the two 
diagnostic groups differed significantly on all three indices: Inhibitory Self-Control (t[ 40] 
= 3.23, p = .002, Cohen's d = 1.00), Flexibility (t[39] = 3.18, p = .003, Cohen's d = 0.99) 
and Emergent Metacognition (t[40] = 3.17,p = .003, Cohen's d = 1.00), with the children 
with DS earning lower (better) T scores than the children with WS on all three indices. 
Discussion 
In the present chapter, four research questions were addressed. The first two 
concerned the performance of the two groups of children on the assessment of general 
intellectual ability. The results confirmed the predictions that children with WS would 
demonstrate better overall intellectual ability and higher verbal abilities than would 
children with DS; the mean GCA and mean Verbal cluster SS for the children with WS 
were significantly higher than the mean GCA and Verbal cluster SS for the children with 
DS. An examination of performance on the DAS-II Nonverbal Reasoning cluster SSs 
indicated a trend for children with WS to demonstrate better Nonverbal Reasoning SSs 
than did the children with DS. In contrast, the performance by children with DS and 
children with WS was comparable on the DAS-II Spatial cluster. 
On average, the children with DS earned SSs in the mild developmental delay 
range for Verbal ability, the borderline to low average range for Nonverbal Reasoning 
ability, and the moderate developmental delay range for Spatial ability. For children with 
WS, standard scores on average were in the borderline to low average range for Verbal 
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ability, the low average range for Nonverbal Reasoning ability, and the moderate 
developmental delay range for Spatial ability. 
The present study is the first to examine intellectual abilities in preschoolers with 
DS using a standardized assessment that is both CA-appropriate and normed low enough 
such that the SSs from the measure are not confounded by floor effects. However, the 
findings relating to overall intellectual ability and verbal ability are consistent with prior 
findings in the literature from studies using raw scores from standardized assessments 
that are CA-appropriate. As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, results of such 
studies have demonstrated that preschool children with WS earn significantly higher 
overall intellectual ability SSs, receptive language raw scores, and expressive language 
raw scores when compared to CA-matched children with DS (Mervis & John, 2010; 
Rowe, 2007). In addition, this same pattern of findings has been replicated when 
comparing CA-matched groups of school-age children with WS and school-age children 
with DS (Klein & Mervis, 1999). 
The third and fourth research questions were concerned with performance of the 
two groups on a parent-report measure of executive functioning ability. The results 
indicated that children with DS demonstrated better overall executive. functioning ability 
than did children with WS. Follow up analyses showed that children with DS earned 
lower scores, indicating better performance, than the children with WS on indices of 
inhibitory self-control, flexibility, and emergent metacognition. 
In the next chapter, I present data from a study I conducted comparing the 
responses of children with DS and children with WS on a social referencing task. More 
specifically, I sought to determine if between-group differences are present in the 
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children's ability to use another person's appraisal of a situation as a guide for his or her 
own behavior (social referencing ability). Then, in Chapters IV, V, and VI, I compared 




THE REGULATORY FUNCTION OF SOCIAL REFERENCING 
As discussed in Chapter I, previous research on social referencing in populations 
with DD suggests that social referencing skills are atypical and may vary as a function of 
neurodevelopmental disorder (e.g., Dissanayake & Crossley, 1996; Sigman, Walden, 
Kneips, & Baxter, 1991; Warreyn, Roeyers, & De Groote, 2005). To date, no data are 
available directly examining the regulatory function of social referencing in children with 
DS or children with WS. In the present chapter, I evaluate whether or not the behavioral 
responses of children with DS and children with WS differ on a standard social 
referencing task in which the experimenter reacts with joy or with fear to an ambiguous 
stimulus. The following research questions were evaluated separately based upon 
whether the adult was joyful or fearful: 
( 1) Do the two groups differ in terms of their rate of looks between the adult and 
the stimulus? 
Previous research exists regarding the gazing behaviors of children with 
DS and children with WS. Rowe et al. (2005) demonstrated that toddlers with 
DS were more likely to shift attention between an adult and toys than were 
toddlers with WS. Based on this finding, I predicted: 
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Prediction: Rate of looks between the experimenter and the ambiguous 
stimulus will be significantly higher for children with DS than for children 
with WS. 
(2) Do the two groups differ in the length of the longest look they produced to the 
experimenter during her behavioral reaction to the ambiguous stimulus? 
Mervis et al. (2003) examined length and intensity of looks by 8 - 43-
month-old children with WS during a clinical genetics evaluation and found 
that these children were significantly more likely than CA-matched children 
with DD of mixed etiology to be rated as consistently looking at the clinical 
geneticist's face during the evaluation. In addition, children with WS were 
significantly more likely than children with DD of mixed etiology to be rated as 
intensely looking at the geneticist. Based on these findings, I predicted: 
Prediction: The longest look produced by children with WS will be 
significantly longer than the longest look produced by children with DS. 
(3) Do the two groups differ in the proportion of children who produced behaviors 
that indicate they both acknowledged the experimenter's behavioral response 
and mapped it to the ambiguous stimulus? 
(4) Do the two groups differ in the proportion of children who superficially 
imitated the experimenter's response to the ambiguous stimulus? 
Fidler, Hepburn, Most, and Philofsky (2007) conducted a study exploring 
rate of emotional responsivity of children with WS between 2 and 8 years of 
age relative to children with DD of mixed etiologies, 30% of whom had DS. 
Results indicated that children with WS were 3.4 times more likely to imitate 
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the experimenter's facial displays and 5.2 times more likely to imitate their 
vocal displays than were children with DD of mixed etiologies. These findings 
remained true even when the children with DS were not included in the 
analyses, suggesting that the performance of children with DS was consistent 
with the mixed etiology group overall. Based on these findings, I predicted: 
Prediction: The proportion of children who imitated the experimenter's 
reaction to the ambiguous stimulus will be significantly higher for children 
with WS than for children with OS. 
(5) Do the two groups differ in the proportion of children who touched or 
attempted to touch the stimulus? 
(6) Do the two groups differ in the proportion of children who produced behaviors 
that indicate they formed an opinion of the stimulus? 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 40 of the 42 children described in Chapter II. One girl with DS 
was excluded from the present study due to experimenter error. To keep the number of 
participants the same in each group, the data for the girl with WS closest in age to the 
excluded participant with DS were also excluded. The final sample included 20 children 
with DS (13 boys, 7 girls) aged 3.51- 5.88 years (M= 4.97; SD = 0.76) and 20 children 
with WS (13 boys, 7 girls) aged 3.52 - 5.94 years (M= 4.92; SD = 0.78). 
Social Referencing Task 
The Social Referencing task (modeled after Campos & Stenberg, 1981; Feinman, 
1982; Klinnert et aI., 1986; Tomasello, 2001) was designed to assess the child's ability to 
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seek out and use information communicated through the behavioral reactions of the 
experimenter to guide hislher own evaluation of and behavior toward the ambiguous 
stimulus. Children were presented with an ambiguous stimulus paired with either a 
positive (joy) or negative (fear) behavioral reaction communicated by an experimenter. 
The experimenter's behavioral reaction included affective, vocal, and postural 
information. Each child's behavior was observed following two different experimenter 
behavioral responses (joy, fear). 
Settings. The settings for this task were two familiar playrooms each observable 
via a one-way mirror. A child-height table was placed in one corner of each room. On top 
of the table was an ambiguous stimulus. Prior to the Social Referencing task, each child 
played with an adult in each of the playrooms to become familiar with the setting. During 
the actual Social Referencing trials, toys were placed on the floor of the room for the 
child and the experimenter to play with until the experimenter was able to get the child in 
the correct position for the trial to be started (see Figure 2 for diagram of room set up.) 
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Figure 2. Diagram of Social Referencing task room setup. The experimenter (E) 
and the child (C) played together with toys on the floor of the playroom until E 
could position C such that the stimulus on the child-height table was directly to the 
left of C and Camera A had a direct view of C. 
Stimuli. For each child, the experimental stimuli consisted of two remote-
controlled mechanical toy robots covered by a cloth. The robots varied in size, shape, 
movement pattern, and sound of the motor to maximize the perceptual cues that indicated 
that the objects moving under the cloth during the two trials were two different objects. 
An opaque cloth (one green, one gray) covered each of the remote-controlled robots. 
While it appeared that the cloth was draped over the object, the cloth was actually fixed 
to a base to ensure that the child would not be able to remove it. This method of 
presenting the stimuli was selected based on pilot testing the stimuli with children with 
WS and TD children in a similar age range. In the absence of a behavioral response from 
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the adult, neither stimulus elicited a strong reaction from the children who participated in 
the pilot test. 
Videotaped camera angles. The Social Referencing task was filmed as a picture-
in-picture video layout. The larger picture was focused on the child, the referent 
(stimulus), and the back of the experimenter. The smaller picture maintained a visual of 
the experimenter's face and torso. 
Procedure. Each child participated in two trials, one with each stimulus. A 
different experimenter conducted each trial. For each child, one experimenter 
demonstrated the behavioral reaction of "joy" and the other demonstrated the behavioral 
reaction of "fear." For almost all children, the two trials took place on consecutive days. 
For the remaining children, the interval between trials was slightly longer. The 
experimenter and the child played together with the toys on the floor for approximately 2 
minutes in a familiar playroom. This allowed the child time to become settled, to become 
disinterested in the toys on the floor, and to be positioned such that he or she would be 
able to see the ambiguous stimulus when it was activated. 
Once the child was positioned correctly (see Figure 2), a second experimenter 
activated the robot from behind a one-way mirror. At this point, the robot, hidden under a 
cloth atop a child-height table, moved. After the robot was activated, the experimenter 
waited either ~3 seconds or until the child initiated eye contact (whichever came first) 
before beginning her specified behavioral reaction, allowing the child the opportunity to 
initiate eye contact with the experimenter. The experimenter's behavioral reaction, 
referred to as the Signal stage, lasted for ~ 10 seconds. During the Signal stage, the 
experimenter alternated gaze between the robot and the child. Following the Signal stage, 
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the experimenter entered the Neutral stage, lasting ~20 seconds, during which the 
experimenter resumed looking at the toys on the floor to avoid giving the child further 
behavioral signals. During this Neutral stage, the experimenter refrained from interacting 
with the child unless the child became distressed or attempted to uncover the robot. If the 
child became distressed, the experimenter comforted the child and removed him or her 
from the playroom. If the child attempted to uncover the robot, the experimenter 
intervened to ensure the child was not successful in removing the cloth. The two Social 
Referencing trials were conducted in two different playrooms (both familiar to the child), 
on two different days, by two different experimenters, in an attempt to limit any 
carryover effect from the first trial. Order of room, experimenter, and behavioral response 
were counterbalanced within each diagnostic group. 
Conditions. The experimenters demonstrated facial expressions based on 
descriptions provide by Izard (1971) and Ekman and Friesen (2003) for the respective 
emotions. 
• Joy: "Comers of lips are drawn back and up. The mouth mayor may not 
be parted with teeth exposed or not. A wrinkle (the naso-Iabial fold) runs 
down from the nose to the outer edge beyond the lip comers. The cheeks 
are raised. The lower eyelid shows wrinkles below it, and may be raised 
but not tense (Ekman & Friesen, 2003, p. 112)." In addition, the 
experimenter vocalized "Ahhhh (joy) and giggling" and demonstrated a 
body posture indicating that she was relaxed and comfortable (e.g., 
clapping and leaning forward). 
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• Fear: "The brows are raised and drawn together. The wrinkles in the 
forehead are in the center, not the entire forehead. The upper eyelid is 
raised, exposing sclera, and the lower eyelid is tensed and drawn up. The 
mouth is open and lips are either tensed slightly and drawn back or 
stretched and drawn back (Ekman & Friesen, 2003, p. 63)." In addition, 
the experimenter vocalized "Gasp (fear)" and tensed her body drawing her 
arms to her chest and her knees closer together. 
Coding. The Social Referencing trials were videotaped for coding purposes. The 
videotapes were coded to examine the experimenter's behavioral reactions, the child's 
gazing behavior, the child's approach to the robot, the child's imitation of the 
experimenter's behavioral reaction, and the child's behavioral reaction. To assess 
reliability, a second person independently coded six randomly selected tapes, three in 
each diagnostic group, which were stratified by age (one 3-year-old, one 4-year-old, and 
one 5-year-old). 
Experimenter Behavioral Reaction. To confirm that the experimenter displayed 
the appropriate emotion, the experimenter's behavioral reaction during the lO-second 
display was coded from the videotape by a coder blind to the conditions and hypotheses 
of the study using a 3-step system for coding facial expressions developed by Hiatt, 
Campos, and Emde (1979). The coding procedure occurred as follows: 
1. Presence of Emotion: For each coding epoch, the coder indicated 
which of the six "primary" emotions (joy, surprise, anger, fear, 
disgust, and sadness) designated by Ekman and Friesen (1971) 
were present or displayed by the experimenter. Noting the presence 
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of any of the six emotions allowed for the scoring of facial 
expression blends, either simultaneous or sequential, which the 
experimenter may have displayed while the child looked at her. 
2. Predominance of Emotion: The rater made a forced choice 
indicating which of the emotions recorded to be present was 
predominant in the facial signal. 
3. Intensity of Emotion: In the last step, a 5-point scale was used to 
judge the intensity of each emotion present in the experimenter's 
face. A score of 1 indicated that the emotion was barely detectable, 
while a score of 5 indicated that the rater could not imagine a face 
showing any greater intensity of the emotional expression being 
displayed naturally. 
These data were evaluated to confirm that intensity of the experimenter's 
emotional display was similar across all participants. In addition to the target emotion, it 
was acceptable for the experimenter to demonstrate 'surprise' as long as the target 
emotion was reported to be the primary emotion. To be included in the study, the 
experimenter's predominant emotion (1) had to be the intended target emotion and (2) 
had to be coded as demonstrating an intensity rating of 4 or 5. Percentage of agreement 
(96.43%) and Cohen's kappa, K = .91 indicated high reliability for which emotion(s) were 
present. High reliability was also observed (percentage of agreement = 100%, K = 1.00) 
for primary emotion identified and for intensity of the predominant emotion. No trials 
were excluded due to errors in experimenter behavioral reaction. 
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Gazing behavior. Children's gazing behavior was coded during the Ambiguous 
and Signal stages of the task using The Observer XT 10.0 (Noldus, 2010), a software 
program that allows for continuous coding of both state (records duration and frequency) 
and event (records frequency) behaviors. The videotapes were coded at 115 of the 
playback speed for when the child was looking at the Experimenter, the Stimulus, the 
Toys on the Floor, Away, or if the child's face was obstructed. A second coder, unaware 
of the hypotheses of the study, used this same procedure to assess reliability. Percentage 
of agreement (99%) and Cohen's kappa, K = .99, using a tolerance window of500 ms, 
indicated very high reliability for gazing behavior. Both the duration of the longest look 
to the experimenter and the rate of looks between the experimenter and stimulus per 
minute were calculated separately for each condition. 
Acknowledgement and mapping of behavioral response. A composite variable 
was created to indicate whether or not children produced behaviors demonstrating that 
they both acknowledged the experimenter's behavioral response and mapped it to the 
stimulus. Children were coded as having mapped the experimenter's behavioral response 
to the stimulus ifthey either shifted their gaze at least once from the experimenter to the 
stimulus during the experimenter's behavioral display or produced verbalizations 
indicating that they understood the experimenter's behavior was about the stimulus. 
In addition, children were coded as to whether or not they produced a behavior 
indicating that they acknowledged the emotion expressed by the experimenter. In the Joy 
condition, if the child smiled or produced a verbalization that referenced the 
experimenter's affective state (e.g., 'It is funny! '), he or she was coded as having 
acknowledged the experimenter's emotion. In the Fear condition, ifthe child became 
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distressed, tried to comfort the experimenter, or tried to explain to the experimenter why 
the stimulus was not scary the child was coded as having acknowledged the 
experimenter's affective response. If the child received positive codes for both mapping 
the experimenter's emotion to the stimulus and acknowledging the emotion for a given 
condition (joy or fear), he or she was then coded as "yes" on the composite variable 
(acknowledge and map) for that condition. A second coder, not informed of the 
hypotheses of the study, used this same procedure to assess reliability. Percentage of 
agreement (91.67%) and Cohen's kappa, K = .82 indicated high reliability for the 
acknowledgement and mapping variable. 
Imitation of behavioral response. Videotapes were also coded for superficial 
imitation of the experimenter's behavioral response. This variable represented situations 
in which the child demonstrated an affectivelbehavioral response because he or she was 
intentionally imitating the experimenter's behavioral response as opposed to actually 
experiencing the response him- or herself. Both the primary and secondary coders were 
blind to the hypotheses of the study. Percentage of agreement (91.67%) and Cohen's 
kappa, K = .80 indicated high reliability. 
Touch stimulus. A dichotomous variable was created to indicate whether or not 
the child touched or attempted to touch the stimulus. Children were coded to have 
touched the stimulus if the experimenter stopped him or her before being able to touch it 
or if the child successfully touched it. A second coder, blind to the hypotheses of the 
study, used this same procedure to assess reliability. Percentage of agreement (100.00%) 
and Cohen's kappa, K = 1.0 indicated very high reliability. 
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Formation of opinion. The coder, using a dichotomous variable, recorded 
whether or not the child demonstrated behaviors that indicated that he or she formed an 
opinion regarding the stimulus. If the child formed an opinion, the coder also indicated 
whether the child's opinion was positive or negative. Both the primary and secondary 
coders were blind to the hypotheses of the study. Percentage of agreement (91.67%) and 
Cohen's kappa, K = .83 indicated high reliability. 
Data Analysis 
This study focused on comparing the behavioral reactions of children with DS and 
children with WS in two situations: (1) when the experimenter was joyful upon seeing an 
ambiguous stimulus, and (2) when the experimenter was fearful upon seeing an 
ambiguous stimulus. As the distributions for 'rate of looks between the experimenter and 
stimulus' and 'duration oflongest look' violated the parametric assumptions of normality, 
Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted. The remaining dependent variables included in 
the present chapter were dichotomous and did not violate the assumption of expected 
frequencies greater than 5. As such, chi-square analyses were performed on the 
dichotomous variables. 
Results 
As order of condition was counterbalanced across children, analyses were 
computed to determine if order of condition affected children's performance on any of the 
variables included in this study. Analyses indicated no significant effect of order on any 
of the dependent variables (allps > .20). Therefore, order was not included as a variable 
in any of the subsequent analyses. 
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Gazing Behavior 
Rate of Looking between Experimenter and Stimulus. Descriptive statistics for 
the gazing behavior variables as a function of condition are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics/or Performance on Gazing Behavior Variables as a Function 0/ 
Condition and Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Measure Mdn Range Mdn Range 
Joy condition 
Rate of Looks+ 10.67 3.28 - 19.89 6.72 0-18.86 
Duration of Longest 2.25 0.58 - 6.62 4.13 0.68 - 13.17 
Look (in sec.) 
Fear condition 
Rate of Looks + 9.98 3.14 - 18.00 7.54 0- 13.36 
Duration of Longest 2.68 1.23 - 11.54 4.33 0.91 - 8.67 
Look (in sec.) 
~umber of looks between Experimenter and Stimulus per minute 
Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to compare the rate oflooks between the 
experimenter and the stimulus for the children with DS in comparison to the children 
with WS in the Joy and Fear conditions (Ufw = .025). As predicted, the distributions of 
rate of looks between the experimenter and the stimulus differed significantly for the two 
diagnostic groups with children with DS demonstrating higher rates of looking between 
the experimenter and the stimulus than did children with WS in both the Joy condition 
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(U= 89.00,p = .002, r = -.48, one-tailed test) and the Fear condition (U= 121.00,p = 
.02, r = -.34, one-tailed test). 
Duration of Longest Look. Mann-Whitney U tests were also conducted to 
compare the duration of longest look to the experimenter between children with DS and 
children with WS in the Joy and Fear conditions (afw= .025). In the Joy condition, the 
distributions of duration of longest look produced by the child did not reach criterion for 
a significant difference between diagnostic groups (U = 222.00, p = .11, r = .20, one-
tailed test). However, as predicted, the distributions of duration oflongest look differed 
significantly between the two diagnostic groups in the Fear condition, with the duration 
of the longest look being longer for children with WS than for chi ldren with DS (U = 
218.00,p = .01, r = .35, one-tailed test). 
Acknowledgment and Mapping of Behavioral Reaction 
To examine the relation between diagnostic group and acknowledgement and 
mapping of the experimenter's behavioral display, two chi-square statistics were 
calculated (afw= .025). The relation between these variables was significant in the Joy 
condition (see Table 4; i[1] = 5.01,p = .025). The odds ratio indicated that children with 
DS were 4.50 times more likely than were children with WS to acknowledge and map the 
experimenter's behavioral display in the Joy condition (CJ95 = [1.17, 17.37]). In contrast, 
the relation between diagnostic group and acknowledgement and mapping of the 
experimenter's behavioral display did not reach criterion for a significant association in 




Number of Children who 'Acknowledged and Mapped' in the Joy Condition as a Function 
of Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not AcknowledgelMap 5 12 
AcknowledgedlMapped 15 8 
Table 5 
Number of Children who 'Acknowledged and Mapped' in the Fear Condition as a 
Function of Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not AcknowledgelMap 8 13 
AcknowledgedlMapped 12 7 
Imitation of Behavioral Reaction 
Finally, chi-square statistics were computed to examine the relation between 
diagnostic group and behavioral response (Ufw = .025). This relation did not meet criterion 
for a significant association in the Joy condition (see Table 6; i[1] = 2.06,p = .08, odds 
ratio = 0.21, CI.95 = [0.02, 2.08], one-tailed test). In the Fear condition, as predicted, the 
relation between these variables was significant (see Table 7; i[1] = 4.80,p = .02, one-
tailed test), with children with WS 6.01 times more likely than children with DS to 
imitate the experimenter's behavioral response (CI.95 = [1.08, 33.28]). 
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Table 6 
Number of Children who 'Imitated' the Experimenter's Behavioral Response in the Joy 
Condition as a Function of Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not Imitate 19 16 
Imitated 1 4 
Table 7 
Number of Children who 'Imitated' the Experimenter's Behavioral Response in the Fear 
Condition as a Function of Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not Imitate 18 12 
Imitated 2 8 
Touch Stimulus 
Two chi-square statistics were performed to examine the relation between 
diagnostic group and touching the stimulus in the Joy condition and in the Fear condition 
(Ufw = .025). The relation between these variables was not significant in the Joy condition 
(see Table 8; l[1] = 3.96,p = .047, odds ratio = 4.0, Cf95 = [0.98, 16.27]). However, this 
relation was significant in the Fear condition (see Table 9; X2 [1] = 5.58,p = .02). The 
odds ratio indicated that children with DS were 5.67 times more likely than were children 
with WS to touch the stimulus in the Fear condition (Cf95 = [1.25, 25.61]). 
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Table 8 
Number of Children who Touched the Stimulus in the Joy Condition as a Function of 
Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not Touch 4 10 
Touched 16 10 
Table 9 
Number of Children who Touched the Stimulus in the Fear Condition as a Function of 
Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not Touch 10 17 
Touched 3 
+One child approached the stimulus and threw it across the room 
Formation of an Opinion 
Two chi-square statistics were calculated to examine the relation between 
diagnostic group and whether or not the child formed an opinion (afw= .025). The 
relation between these variables did not reach criterion for a significant association in the 
Joy condition (see Table 10; l[1] = l.13,p = .29, odds ratio = 2.15, CI.95 = [0.52,9.00]). 
Descriptive statistics addressing the emotional valence of the opinions that were formed 
indicated that most children with DS (15/16) and most children with WS (11/13) who 
were rated to have formed any opinion of the stimulus were rated to have formed a 
positive opinion. 
In contrast, the relation between diagnostic group and formation of opinion was 
significant in the Fear condition (see Table 11; l[1] = 6.47,p = .01) with children with 
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DS 5.57 times more likely than were children with WS to form an opinion of the stimulus 
(CI.95 = [1.42, 21.86]). Descriptive statistics addressing the emotional valence ofthe 
opinions that were formed indicated that despite the experimenter's fearful reaction, only 
a small proportion of the children who did form an opinion in the Fear condition (5/13 
children with DS and 2/5 children with WS) were rated as having formed a negative 
opinion of the stimulus. Thus, the majority of children who formed an opinion of the 
stimulus in the Fear condition were rated as having formed a positive opinion. 
Descriptive information was also collected to provide more specific information 
regarding the responses of children who formed a positive opinion in the Fear condition 
(DS: n = 8, WS: n = 3). For children with DS, the results were as follows: four children 
saw the experimenter's fearful reaction and then approached the stimulus, one child 
watched the experimenter's fearful reaction for its entire duration and then approached the 
stimulus, one child watched the experimenter's fearful reaction for its entire duration and 
slyly approached the stimulus while checking to make sure the experimenter was not 
looking, one child decided the stimulus was an elephant and maintained this opinion even 
after seeing the fearful reaction, and one child communicated to the experimenter that she 
should not be afraid and approached the stimulus to show her it was okay. For children 
with WS, the results were as follows: two children saw the experimenter's fearful reaction 
and then approached the stimulus and one child watched the experimenter's fearful 
reaction for its entire duration and then approached the stimulus. 
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Table 10 
Number of Children who 'Formed an Opinion' of the Stimulus in the Joy Condition as a 
Function of Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not Fonn an Opinion 4 7 
F onned an Opinion 16 13 
Table 11 
Number of Children who 'Formed an Opinion' of the Stimulus in the Fear Condition as a 
Function of Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not Fonn an Opinion 7 15 
F onned an Opinion 13 5 
Discussion 
In the present study, I addressed six research questions based upon whether the 
experimenter's reaction to the ambiguous stimulus was joyful or fearful. The first 
research question was concerned with the rate of looks between the experimenter and the 
stimulus for children with DS and children with WS in response to the experimenter's 
behavioral reactions. The results confinned the prediction that the rate of looks between 
the experimenter and the ambiguous stimulus would be significantly higher for children 
with DS than for children with WS; the distribution of rate of looks for children with DS 
was significantly higher than the distribution of rate of looks for children with WS in 
both the Joy condition and the Fear condition. 
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The second research question was concerned with the duration of longest look to 
the experimenter by children with DS and children with WS. The prediction that the 
longest look to the experimenter produced by children with WS would be significantly 
longer than the longest look to the experimenter produced by children with DS was 
confirmed in the Fear condition but not in the Joy condition; the distribution of duration 
of longest look produced by children with WS was significantly higher than the 
distribution oflongest look for children with DS in the Fear condition but not in the Joy 
condition. 
The third research question addressed the likelihood that the two groups of 
children would acknowledge the adult's reaction and map it to the stimulus. Results 
indicated a significant difference between the two groups of children in the Joy condition 
with children with DS (75.0%) more likely than were than children with WS (40.0%) to 
acknowledge the experimenter's reaction and map it to the stimulus. In the Fear 
condition, children with DS (60.0%) were more likely than were children with WS 
(35.0%) to acknowledge the experimenter's reaction and map it to the stimulus; however, 
this difference did not reach criterion for a significant difference between groups. 
The fourth research question addressed the likelihood that the two groups of 
children would imitate the experimenter's reaction to the stimulus. The prediction that 
children with WS would be significantly more likely than children with DS to imitate was 
not confirmed in the Joy condition but was confirmed in the Fear condition. The relation 
between likelihood of imitating the experimenter's reaction and diagnostic group 
demonstrated a trend for children with WS (20.0%) to be more likely than were children 
with DS (5.26%) to imitate the experimenter's joyful reaction. This relation was 
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significant in the Fear condition as children with WS (40.0%) were more likely than were 
children with DS (11.11 %) to imitate the experimenter's reaction. 
The fifth research question considered the likelihood that the two groups of 
children would approach the ambiguous stimulus. Results indicated that there was a 
marginally significant relation between touching the stimulus and diagnostic group in the 
Joy condition with 80% of children with DS and 50% of children with WS having 
touched or attempting to touch the stimulus (p = .047). The relation between these 
variables was significant in the Fear condition with children with DS (50.0%) more likely 
than were children with WS (15.0%) to touch the stimulus. 
The sixth research question addressed the likelihood that the two groups of 
children would form an opinion of the stimulus. While children with DS (80.0%) were 
more likely than were children with WS (65.0%) to form an opinion of the stimulus in the 
Joy condition, this difference did not reach criterion for a significant difference between 
groups. In addition, results indicated that the majority of both children with DS (93.75%) 
and children with WS (84.52%) who formed any opinion of the stimulus formed a 
positive opinion. In the Fear condition, the likelihood of forming an opinion also varied 
significantly as a function of diagnostic group with children with DS (60.0%) more likely 
than were children with WS (35.0%) to form any opinion. However, few of the children 
with DS (38.46%) and children with WS (40.0%) who formed any opinion of the 
stimulus formed a negative opinion. Closer examination of the behavioral responses of 
the children who formed a positive opinion of the fearful stimulus indicated that only one 
child, a child with DS, communicated to the experimenter that her fearful reaction was 
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incorrect. Most of the children with OS (6/8) and children with WS (2/3) saw the 
experimenter's fearful reaction and got up to approach the stimulus. 
Overall, the results of the present study demonstrate that the children with OS 
shifted their gaze between the experimenter and the stimulus more frequently than did the 
children with WS. However, the children with OS were still more likely to touch the 
stimulus when the experimenter was fearful than were the children with WS and 
frequently formed a positive opinion of the stimulus. Although the children with WS 
were less likely to approach the stimulus in the Fear condition than were the children 
with OS, they were more likely to produce "long looks" watching the experimenter's 
fearful reaction, more likely to imitate the fearful reaction, and less likely to form an 
opinion of the stimulus than were the children with OS. Similarly to the children with 
OS, when children with WS did form an opinion in the Fear condition, it was more likely 
to be positive than negative. Despite clearly seeing the experimenter's fearful reaction, the 
majority of children in both groups who formed an opinion approached the stimulus 
without communicating disagreement with the experimenter or demonstrating behaviors 
suggesting they saw through her fearful reaction. 
As these results indicate, in response to the experimenter's expression of fear, few 
children in either diagnostic group demonstrated a reaction toward the stimulus indicative 
of comprehending the communicative significance of the experimenter's reaction and 
using this information to guide his or her own behavior. As performance on the Social 
Referencing task requires a child to coordinate multiple abilities, it is difficult to specify 
from this task alone what kinds of specific challenges children in the two groups are 
encountering in the social referencing process. To help provide insight into potential 
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areas of difficulty, in the next three chapters (Chapters IV, V, and VI) I examine three 
abilities that are fundamental to the social referencing process. In Chapter IV, I present 
the results of a study comparing the ability of children with DS and children with WS to 
initiate looks to the experimenter in three situations in which the child's attention was 
first focused on an object. In such a situation, the child must shift his or her attention 
from the object to the experimenter in order to gain access to the experimenter's message. 
As such, initiating eye contact with an adult during interactions with objects is one of the 
fundamental abilities involved in the social referencing process. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INITIATING EYE CONTACT 
During the first two years of life, children develop the ability to use social 
referencing as a regulatory function. In other words, children develop the ability to 
reference another person and use that person's appraisal of a situation when forming their 
own opinion, particularly in situations of ambiguity or uncertainty. Human beings are 
skillful at examining a situation based on another person's point of view, in that they are 
able to determine what other people are perceiving, intending, desiring, knowing, and 
believing (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). One of the earliest mental 
states understood by TD children is "intention." This ability is often argued to be the 
foundation of "mind reading," or theory of mind ability (Tomasello et aI., 2005), and to 
be evidence of the child's recognition of people as subjective intentional beings 
(Meltzoff, 1995; Thompson, 2006) 
Children's conceptual understanding of people as subjective intentional agents 
develops over time. One of the earliest developmental stages of the understanding of 
intentions involves a child's ability to realize that people's actions have goals or have a 
purpose behind them (Tomasello et aI., 2005). The results of previous research 
demonstrate that 18-month-old TD children understand that people have goals and 
intentions that inanimate objects do not have. Furthermore, TD 18-month-olds are able to 
distinguish between another person's intentional and accidental actions (Meltzoff, 1995). 
The foundational skills for understanding people as subjective agents are present in even 
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younger children. For example, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, and Rutter (1992) demonstrated 
that when the goal of an adult's action is ambiguous, TD infants as young as 9 months of 
age looked to the adult's face. By looking to the adult's face in this scenario, the child is 
able to acquire more information about the intention of the adult's action. 
In order to examine children's ability to initiate eye contact with an adult, an 
important underlying ability involved in social referencing, I investigated the looking 
behavior of preschoolers with DS or WS in three situations in which looking at the 
experimenter would require the child to shift his or her attention away from a toy of 
interest. The following research questions were evaluated: 
(1) Do preschoolers with DS and preschoolers with WS differ in their likelihood 
of looking at the experimenter in response to a blocking, teasing, or giving 
gesture? 
(2) Are there differences in the use of eye contact by children with DS and 
children with WS in response to the experimenter's gestures? 
Results of previous studies have indicated that in triadic situations, 
children with WS evidence impairments in their use of eye gaze relative to 
both MA-matched TD children and CA- and MA-matched children with DS 
(e.g., Laing et aI., 2002; Rowe et aI., 2005). Based on these findings, I 
predicted: 
Prediction: Children with DS will be more likely to look at the 





Participants were the 42 children described in Chapter II. One boy with DS 
consistently cried in response to the Teasing condition. For this reason, his data, as well 
as those of the boy with WS closest in age to him, were excluded from the Teasing 
condition analyses. 
Goal Ambiguity Task 
The children were administered a task developed by Phillips et al. (1992). This 
task, which will be referred to as the Goal Ambiguity task, was designed to assess the 
child's use of gaze in response to gestures made by an adult that vary with regard to the 
ambiguity of the adult's intention. 
Setting. The task trials were administered to the child during two structured play 
interactions at a table, each with a different experimenter and on a different day. The 
experimenter sat diagonally across the table from the child. 
Videotaped Camera Angles. The Goal Ambiguity task was filmed using a split 
screen video layout with one video screen larger than the other. The larger picture was 
focused on the front of the child, the table, and the back of the experimenter. The smaller 
picture was focused on the front of the experimenter. 
Procedure. The experimenter and child played at the table together with various 
developmentally appropriate toys, one toy at a time. The experimenter would pull out a 
toy and play with it to develop the child's interest in the toy. Once the child was 
interested, the experimenter encouraged the child to play with the toy by handing it (or 
starting to hand it) to the child. Two of the gestures (blocking and teasing) demonstrated 
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by the experimenter were intended to create a situation that would encourage the child to 
look at the experimenter, as the intention behind the experimenter's gesture was 
ambiguous. The intention behind the experimenter's third gesture (give) was not 
ambiguous and therefore was not intended to draw the child's attention to the 
experimenter. 
The three conditions were administered as follows: 
• Blocking: In the context of a play activity, the experimenter encouraged 
the child to play with a developmentally appropriate toy. Once the child 
was interested in the toy, the experimenter handed the toy to the child. 
When the child was engaged with the toy both manually and visually, the 
experimenter covered the child's hands with her own hands, preventing 
the child from further activity. This gesture was held for 4 seconds while 
looking at the child with neutral affect or until the child initiated eye 
contact (whichever came first). The child's eye contact with the 
experimenter was noted during this 4-second period, as were any other 
responses (both verbal and nonverbal) he or she made. Each child was 
administered six Blocking trials (3 trials with one experimenter on Day 1 
and 3 trials with the second experimenter on Day 2). 
• Teasing: The experimenter encouraged the child to play with a 
developmentally appropriate toy within the context of a play activity. 
Once the child was interested in the toy, the experimenter offered the toy 
to the child. As the child reached for the toy, the experimenter quickly 
withdrew it and held the toy out of the child's reach for 4 seconds while 
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looking at the child with neutral affect. After 4 seconds had elapsed or the 
child initiated eye contact (whichever came first), the child was given the 
toy. The child's eye contact with the experimenter was noted during this 
4-second period, as were any other responses (both verbal and nonverbal) 
he or she made. Each child was administered six Teasing trials (3 trials 
with one experimenter on Day 1 and 3 trials with a second experimenter 
on Day 2). 
• Giving: In the context of a play activity, the experimenter encouraged the 
child to play with a developmentally appropriate toy. Once the child was 
interested in the toy, the experimenter handed the toy to the child with 
neutral affect and the child was allowed to play with it. Each child was 
administered six Giving trials (3 trials with one experimenter on Day 1 
and 3 trials with a second experimenter on Day 2). 
Coding. A primary coder watched the videotapes and assessed whether or not the 
child made eye contact with the experimenter within 4 seconds of the experimenter's 
action. Children's eye contact with the experimenter was coded using The Observer XT 
10.0 (Noldus, 2010). The latency between the start of the trial (see definitions below) and 
the onset of eye contact made by the child was calculated. The child was considered to 
have made eye contact with the experimenter if eye contact was made within 4 seconds 
of the start of the trial. A variable was then calculated indicating the proportion of trials 
during which the child made eye contact with the experimenter for each condition. The 
start of the trial was defined as follows: (1) Blocking condition: the point at which the 
experimenter placed her hands over the child's hands, (2) Teasing condition: the point at 
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which the experimenter pulled the toy away from the child, (3) Giving condition: the 
point at which the child placed his or her hand on the toy. Percentage of agreement 
(92.59%) and Cohen's kappa, K = .85 indicated high reliability. 
Data Analysis 
This study focused on examining the likelihood of looks to the experimenter in 
response to three gestures. Data from this task violated the parametric assumption of 
normality. As such, Wilcoxon signed-rank test and Mann-Whitney U test statistics were 
computed. 
Results 
Due to administration errors, problems with videotape quality, or child refusal, 
data for 9 of240 trials in the Blocking condition and 14 of240 trials in the Teasing 
condition could not be scored. Accordingly, performance on the Goal Ambiguity task 
was measured by proportion of trials on which the child looked at the experimenter 
within 4 seconds of the start of the trial rather than number of trials the child looked at the 
experimenter. Descriptive statistics for proportion of trials on which children with DS or 
children with WS looked at the experimenter's face within 4 seconds of the onset of the 
trial for each condition are reported in Table 12. 
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Table 12. 
Descriptive Statistics for Proportion of Trials on which Children Looked at the 
Experimenter's Face within Four Seconds of Trial Onset in the Goal Ambiguity Task 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Measure Mdn Range Mdn Range 
Ambiguous 
Blocking 0.80 0.17 - 1.00 0.83 0.00 - 1.00 
Teasing 0.67 0.17 - 1.00 0.83 0.00 - 1.00 
Non-Ambiguous 
Giving 0.33 0.00 - 1.00 0.33 0.00 - 0.67 
Within-Group Comparisons across Conditions 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics were calculated to compare performance on 
the two ambiguous gesture conditions of the Goal Ambiguity task (afw = .025). Separate 
analyses were computed for children with DS and children with WS. The differences in 
distributions of performance on the Blocking and Teasing conditions did not reach 
criterion for a statistical difference for either children with DS (T= 92.50,p = .20, r = 
.29) or children with WS (T= 63.00,p = .79, r = -.06). 
To compare the looking behavior of children with DS and children with WS 
between each of the ambiguous gesture conditions (Blocking and Teasing) and the non-
ambiguous gesture condition (Giving), Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics were 
calculated separately for each syndrome group (afw = .013). Results comparing 
performance on the Blocking condition to performance on the Giving condition indicated 
that both children with DS (T= 15.00,p = .003, r = -.65) and children with WS (T= 7.00, 
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p < .001, r = -.80) looked at the experimenter on a larger proportion of the trials in the 
Blocking condition than in the Giving condition. Similarly, results indicated that both 
children with DS (T= 3.00,p < .001, r = -.81) and children with WS (T= 5.00,p < .001, 
r = -.82) looked at the experimenter on a larger proportion of the trials in the Teasing 
condition than in the Giving condition. 
Between Group Comparisons across Conditions 
Mann-Whitney U test statistics were computed to examine performance in the 
two ambiguous gesture conditions as a function of diagnostic group (ujW = .025). The 
distributions for the proportion of trials on which the child made eye contact in the 
Blocking condition (U = 207.00, p = .73, r = -0.05) and the Teasing condition (U = 
200.50,p = .99, r = 0.002) did not react criterion for a significant difference between 
groups. To consider the performance of the two diagnostic groups in the unambiguous 
gesture condition, a Mann-Whitney U test was conducted with proportion of trials on 
which the child made eye contact with the experimenter in the Giving condition as the 
dependent variable. As predicted, the distributions for the proportion of trials on which 
the child made eye contact in the Giving condition differed significantly between the two 
diagnostic groups (U = 304.00, p = .02, r = -0.33, one-tailed), with children with DS 
looking at the experimenter on a larger proportion of the Giving trials than did children 
with WS. 
Discussion 
In the present study, two research questions were addressed. The first was 
concerned with the likelihood of looking at an adult in response to three types of gestures. 
The results indicated that both children with DS and children with WS were significantly 
more likely to look at the experimenter in response to her blocking and teasing gestures 
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than in response to her giving gestures. These findings demonstrate that both groups of 
children were responsive to the design manipulation, as the blocking and teasing gestures 
were designed to create a situation in which the child would be expected to shift his or 
her attention from the object of interest to the experimenter. 
This pattern of looking more frequently in response to ambiguous gestures than to 
non-ambiguous gestures was argued by Phillips and colleagues (1992) to be evidence that 
the purpose of the child's look is information-seeking, which indicates the child's attempt 
to "clarify" the adult's goal. In the study conducted by Phillips and colleagues (1992), 
both TD infants (n = 18; mean CA = 14.2 months, range: 9 - 18 months) and children 
with DD (n = 18; mean CA = 60.4 months, range: 40 - 86 months), six of whom had DS, 
demonstrated this same pattern of findings. In contrast, the participants with autism (n = 
18; mean CA = 53.3 months, range: 36 -70 months),who were CA- and MA-matched to 
the children with DD, looked at the experimenter's hand or the toy rather than the 
experimenter's face. 
Direct comparisons between the looking behavior of children with DS and 
children with WS confirmed the prediction that children with DS would be more likely 
than would children with WS to look at the experimenter when the intention behind her 
gesture was not ambiguous; the distribution of the likelihood of looking at the 
experimenter in the Giving condition for children with DS was significantly higher than 
was the corresponding distribution for children with WS. This finding is consistent with 
that of Rowe et al. (2005), who found that children with WS were significantly less likely 
to initiate DJA acts or shift gaze between an object and an adult than were CA-, DQ-, and 
expressive vocabulary size-matched children with DS. In the present study, comparisons 
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of the distributions of the likelihood of looking at the experimenter in response to the 
experimenter's ambiguous gestures (Blocking and Teasing conditions) did not reach 
criterion for a significant difference between the two groups of children. 
When one considers the social referencing process, after the child shifts his or her 
attention to the experimenter to obtain the message, the child must then be able to 
identify the focus of the experimenter's attention by following her gaze to determine the 
referent of interest. In the next chapter, I present the results of a study I conducted to 
evaluate children's ability to follow another person's gaze, the fundamental ability 
involved in linking the experimenter's reaction to an object when the child's attention is 




As discussed in Chapter I, the ability to follow another person's gaze allows the 
child to determine what the adult's reaction is about (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2002; Moses, 
Baldwin, Rosicky, & Tidball, 2001; Repacholi, 1998). At about 10 months of age, TD 
children will selectively follow changes in another person's eye gaze (e.g., Brooks & 
Meltzoff, 2002; Corkum & Moore, 1995). In the present chapter, in order to examine the 
ability to follow another person's gaze, I investigated the likelihood that children with DS 
and children with WS would follow another person's head tum when her eyes were open 
vs. when her eyes were closed. The following research questions were evaluated: 
(1) Are children with DS and children with WS more likely to look in the same 
direction as an adult's head tum when the adult's eyes are open in comparison 
to when her eyes are closed? 
(2) Are there differences between children with DS and children with WS in the 
likelihood of looking in the same direction as an adult when her head turns 
and her eyes are open? 
John and Mervis (2010) conducted a study exploring the ability of 
preschoolers with DS and preschoolers with WS to comprehend the 
communicative intent behind pointing and gaze-shifting gestures. Results 
indicated that despite significantly lower overall intellectual ability and 
language scores, significantly more children with DS (60.0%) as compared to 
88 
children with WS (26.7%) followed a communicative gesture to find a hidden 
object at a rate significantly higher than chance. Based on this finding, I 
predicted: 
Participants 
Prediction: Children with DS will be more likely than will children 
with WS to look in the same direction as an adult when her head turns 
and her eyes are open. 
Method 
Participants were the 42 children described in Chapter II. 
Gaze Following Task 
The children were administered a Gaze Following task (modeled after Brooks & 
Meltzoff, 2002; Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998) which was designed to examine 
the child's ability to monitor looking/gazing behavior. More specifically, this task 
provides information as to whether following an adult's gaze reflects an understanding of 
the gazer's focus of attention. 
Setting. The task trials were administered to the child during two structured play 
interactions at a table, each with a different experimenter and on a different day. The 
experimenter sat diagonally across the table from the child. 
Videotaped Camera Angles. The Gaze Following task was filmed using a split 
screen video layout with one video screen larger than the other. The larger picture was 
focused on the front of the child, the table, and the back of the experimenter. The smaller 
picture was focused on the front of the experimenter. 
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Procedure. The experimenter and child played at a table with a series of 
developmentally appropriate toys. Before the start of each head turn, the experimenter 
removed the toy the child had been playing with from his or her view. Next, the 
experimenter made eye contact with the child to ensure that each child began the trial in a 
controlled manner. After eye contact had been established, the experimenter turned her 
head (and eyes) toward a target to either her left or her right while demonstrating the 
appropriate cue in conjunction with a subtle vocalization ("Oh, hmm"). The experimenter 
demonstrated one of two cues: 
• Eyes Open: The experimenter turned her head and eyes toward the object 
with eyes open and said "Oh, hmm." The experimenter fixated on the 
target for 5 seconds. After the 5 seconds had elapsed, the experimenter 
returned to midline, made eye contact with the child, and resumed the play 
interaction. 
• Eyes Closed: The experimenter established eye contact with the child, 
closed her eyes, and turned her head toward the object and said "Oh, 
hmm." The experimenter maintained this position for 5 seconds. After the 
5 seconds had elapsed, the experimenter returned to midline, opened her 
eyes, made eye contact with the child, and resumed the play interaction. 
Coding. A primary coder coded all of the videotapes. The coder was only able to 
see the larger of the two video screens (the one focused on the front of the child) and 
therefore was blind with regard to the condition (open vs. closed eyes) and direction of 
the experimenter's head turn. The targets were not visible in the video. However, the 
coder was informed that targets were located on the walls to both the left and the right 
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between the child and the experimenter. The coder then scored each trial for whether or 
not the child intentionally looked for a target. If the coder indicated that the child 
intentionally looked for a target, she was asked also to indicate if the child looked at the 
target on the left or the target on the right. 
After all of the trials were coded, the coder then watched the tape a second time 
with both video screens visible to determine if the target the child looked at was the 
correct target, that is if it was the same target the experimenter turned her head toward. 
Of 252 trials, there were 7 trials in the Closed Eyes condition (4 trials by children with 
DS and 3 trials by children with WS) and 4 trials in the Open Eyes condition (3 trials by 
children with DS and 1 trial by a child with WS) on which the child turned his or her 
head in the opposite direction of the experimenter. A variable ("follow") was computed 
indicating the number of trials during which the child looked at the correct target within 5 
seconds of the experimenter's head tum, separately for the Eyes Open condition and the 
Eyes Closed condition. To assess reliability a second person independently coded three 
randomly selected tapes stratified by participant age (one 3-year-old, one 4-year-old, and 
one 5-year-old.) for each diagnostic group. Percentage of agreement (97.8%) and Cohen's 
kappa, K = .96 indicated very high reliability. 
Data Analysis 
This study focused on examining the likelihood of following another person's 
head tum paired with either open eyes or closed eyes. Data from this task violated the 
parametric assumption of normality. As such, Wilcoxon signed-rank test and Mann-
Whitney U test statistics were computed. 
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Results 
As order of condition and direction of adult's look were counterbalanced, 
analyses were computed to determine if order of Eyes Open or Eyes Closed trials and 
order of look to left or look to right affected children's following performance. Analyses 
indicated no significant effect of order (p = .77) or direction of adult's look (p = .81) on 
the dependent variable. Therefore, order was not included as a variable in any of the 
subsequent analyses. 
Descriptive statistics for performance on the Eyes Open and Eyes Closed 
conditions are reported in Table 13. To examine following as a function of condition, 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were computed separately for children with DS and children 
with WS (Ufw = .025). Results indicated that the distributions of following differed 
significantly as a function of condition for both children with DS (T = 2.0, p < .001, r = 
.87) and children with WS (T= 4.00,p = .001, r = .75). For both diagnostic groups, 
children were significantly more likely to follow the experimenter's head turn in the Eyes 
Open condition in comparison to the Eyes Closed condition. 
Table 13 
Descriptive Statisticsfor 'Following' as a Function of Diagnostic Group in the Gaze 
Following Task 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Measure Mdn Range Mdn Range 
Eyes Open Follow 5.00 1.00 - 6.00 4.00 0.00- 6.00 
Eyes Closed Follow 1.00 0.00-4.00 o 0.00-3.00 
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Mann-Whitney U tests were computed to compare the following behavior of 
children with DS and children with WS in the Eyes Closed condition and in the Eyes 
Open condition (Ufw = .025). The distributions of performance in the Eyes Closed 
condition between children with DS and children with WS did not reach criterion for a 
significant difference between diagnostic groups (U = 270.00, P = .16, r = .22). In 
contrast, as predicted, the distributions of performance in the Eyes Open condition 
differed significantly between the two diagnostic groups (U = 300.00, p = .025, r = .32, 
one-tailed test) with children with DS more likely than children with WS to follow the 
experimenter's head tum in the Eyes Open condition. 
Discussion 
In the present chapter, two research questions were addressed concerning the 
likelihood of looking in the same direction as an adult's head tum when the adult's eyes 
were open and the likelihood of looking in the same direction as an adult's head tum 
when the adult's eyes were closed. The results indicated that for both diagnostic groups, 
children were significantly more likely to look in the same direction as an adult's head 
tum when her eyes were open than when her eyes were closed. This pattern of findings 
indicates that both preschoolers with DS and preschoolers with WS are sensitive to what 
another person's eyes are doing and interpret the person's looks as referential acts. 
Comparisons of the likelihood of looking in the same direction as an adult's head 
tum between the two groups of children confirmed the prediction that children with DS 
would be significantly more likely than would children with WS to look in the same 
direction as an adult when her head turned and her eyes were open. That is, the 
occurrence of gaze following in the Eyes Open condition for children with DS was 
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significantly higher than the occurrence of gaze following in the Eyes Open condition for 
children with WS. Gaze following rates did not differ significantly for the two groups in 
the Eyes Closed condition. 
Although this is the first study directly focused on comparing the gaze following 
abilities of children with DS and children with WS, support for the finding of poorer 
response to joint attention for children with WS relative to children with DS is available 
within the existing literature examining the early socio-communicative abilities of 
children with these syndromes. Results of a study conducted by John and Mervis (2010) 
demonstrated that despite significantly lower overall intellectual ability and language 
scores, significantly more children with DS (60%) than children with WS (26.7%) 
followed a communicative gesture (gaze shifting or pointing paired with gaze shifting) to 
find a hidden object at a rate significantly higher than chance. In addition, Rowe and 
colleagues (2005) found that children with DS were significantly more likely to respond 
to joint attention (follow a pointing gesture) than were children with WS matched on CA, 
DQ, and expressive vocabulary size. 
Thus far, I have presented data concerning two abilities that are fundamental to 
the social referencing process: the child's ability to shift his or her attention from an 
object to an adult (initiate eye contact) and the child's ability to shift his or her attention 
from an adult to an object in which the adult has taken an interest (gaze following.) In the 
next chapter, I examine the third ability fundamental to the social referencing process, the 
child's ability to comprehend the communicative significance of another person's 
emotionally valenced behavioral response. 
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CHAPTER VI 
UTILIZING EMOTIONAL REACTIONS 
Affective expressions are an important part of the communicative process in that 
they can be used to regulate other people's behavior (Ho10dynski & Fried1meier, 2005). 
Even at a young age, TD children are very attentive to other people's emotions. Around 6 
months of age TD infants respond differentially to their mothers' happy and sad 
expressions (Cohn et al., 1990; Termine & Izard, 1988) and around 12 months of age TD 
infants use the emotional information communicated by another person to help appraise 
ambiguous situations (e.g., Feinman, 1992b; Sorce et al., 1985). In this chapter, I evaluate 
whether or not the behavioral responses of children with DS and children with WS differ 
on a task similar to the Social Referencing task (Chapter III) with one key difference, a 
reduction in the attentiona1 demands on the child. The following research questions were 
evaluated separately based upon whether the experimenter demonstrated a joyful or 
fearful reaction toward a stimulus: 
(1) Do the two groups differ in the proportion of children who acknowledged the 
experimenter's behavioral display and mapped it to the contents of the box? 
(2) Do the two groups differ in the proportion of children who superficially 
imitated the experimenter's response to the content of the box? 
Fidler et al. (2007) conducted a study exploring the rates of emotional 
responsivity of children with WS between 2 and 8 years of age relative to 
children with DD of mixed etiologies, 30% of who had DS. Their results 
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indicated that children with WS were 3.4 times more likely to imitate 
experimenter's facial displays and 5.2 times more likely to imitate their vocal 
displays than were children with DD of mixed etiologies. These findings 
remained true even when the children with DS were not included in the 
analyses, suggesting that the performance of children with DS was consistent 
with the mixed etiology group overall. Based on these findings, I predicted: 
Prediction: The proportion of children who imitated the experimenter's 
reaction to the ambiguous stimulus will be significantly higher for 
children with WS than for children with DS. 
(3) Do the two groups differ in the proportion of children who attempted to touch 
the box? 
(4) Do the two groups differ in the proportion of children who produced 




Participants were 40 of the 42 children described in Chapter II. One girl with DS 
was excluded from the present study due to experimenter error. To keep the number of 
participants the same in each group, the girl with WS closest in age to the excluded child 
with DS was also excluded from the study. The final sample was the same as in the Floor 
Task (Chapter III). 
The present study used a between-subjects design with approximately half of the 
children in the Joy condition and half ofthe children in the Fear condition. (See the 
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Procedure section for an explanation of why a between-subjects design rather than a 
within-subjects design was used.) The sample of children in the Joy condition included 
11 children with DS (8 boys, 3 girls) aged 3.77 - 5.87 years (M= 4.88 years, SD = 0.79) 
and 11 children with WS (6 boys, 5 girls) aged 3.52 - 5.81 years (M = 4.80 years, SD = 
0.83). The sample of children in the Fear condition included 9 children with DS (5 boys, 
4 girls) aged 3.51 - 5.88 years (M= 5.07 years, SD = 0.75) and 9 children with WS (7 
boys, 2 girls) aged 3.70 - 5.94 years (M= 5.07 years, SD = 0.73). The two diagnostic 
groups were well matched for CA in both the Joy condition (p = .67) and the Fear 
condition (p = .97). 
Surprise Box Task 
The Surprise Box task (modeled after Scambler, Hepburn, Rutherford, Wehner, & 
Rogers, 2007) was designed both to evaluate children's responses to other people's 
emotional reactions (i.e., Joy and Fear) and to elicit emotional responses from children. 
While the Surprise Box task is similar to the Social Referencing task described in Chapter 
III, there are two key differences: (1) In the Surprise Box task the referent is in a box held 
by the experimenter, making it easier for the child to shift attention from the referee to 
the referent and (2) in the Surprise Box task the experimenter assumes the responsibility 
of ensuring she has the child's attention prior to demonstrating her behavioral reaction 
toward the contents of the box. This task was used to examine the child's ability to assess 
emotional information when attentional demands are reduced. 
Setting. The task trials were administered to the child during two structured play 
interactions at a table, each with a different experimenter and on a different day. The 
experimenter sat diagonally across the table from the child. 
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Videotaped Camera Angles. The Surprise Box task was filmed using a split 
screen video layout with one video screen larger than the other. The larger picture was 
focused on the front ofthe child, the table, and the back of the experimenter. The smaller 
picture was focused on the front of the experimenter. 
Procedure. Each child participated in six trials, three on Day 1 and three on Day 
2. Only the first of each participant's six trials was included in the analyses, resulting in a 
between-subjects design. The decision to include only the first trial was made based on 
experimenters' observations that the children clearly demonstrated carryover from the 
previously administered trials. The experimenters' observations were verified by 
statistical analyses that indicated significant order effects (p = .02). 
The box was paired with one of two behavioral reactions communicated by the 
experimenter Goy or fear). In the context of a play activity, the experimenter pulled out a 
small gift box and said, "I wonder what's in here." At no point during the trial was the 
child able to see the contents of the box. Once the experimenter had the child's attention, 
she opened the box and, while looking in the box, demonstrated the specified behavioral 
reaction for -10 seconds, referred to as the Signal stage, alternating gaze between the 
contents of the box and the child. Once the Signal stage ended, indicated by a tap on the 
mirror by a researcher in the observation room, the experimenter entered the Neutral 
stage, lasting -20 seconds, during which the experimenter displayed a neutral facial 
expression and looked down at something under the table for -20 seconds to avoid giving 
the child any other cues. During this Neutral stage, the experimenter refrained from 
interacting with the child, unless the child became distressed or attempted to reach for the 
box. In situations where the child became distressed, the experimenter removed the box 
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from the table, comforted the child, and distracted the child by playing with more toys. If 
the child attempted to reach for the box, the experimenter removed the box from the table 
and tried to distract the child by playing with more toys. The Surprise Box trial was 
conducted in a familiar playroom. Playroom location, experimenter, and behavioral 
reaction were alternated across participants in each diagnostic group. 
Conditions. The experimenters demonstrated the facial expressions of joy and 
fear according to the descriptions provided by Izard (1971) and Ekman and Friesen 
(2003) for the respective emotions. These patterns were the same as described in Chapter 
III. 
Coding. The Surprise Box trials were videotaped for coding purposes. The 
primary coder, blind to the hypotheses of the study, coded all of the videotapes. To assess 
reliability, a second person independently coded six randomly selected tapes, three in 
each diagnostic group, which were stratified by age (one 3-year-old, one 4-year-old, and 
one 5-year-old). The videotapes were coded to evaluate the experimenter's affective 
displays as well as to create the following dependent variables: 1) child's reach to the 
box, 2) child's imitation of the experimenter's behavioral reaction, and 3) child's 
formation of an opinion. In the four subsections below, I outline the procedures used to 
code the experimenter's affective display and the three dependent variables. 
Experimenter Affective Display. To confirm that the experimenter displayed the 
appropriate emotion, the coding procedure that was used to code Experimenter Affective 
Display in Chapter III was used to code Experimenter Affective Display in the Surprise 
Box task. As in the Floor Task, the coder first indicated which of six emotions 
(Happiness, Surprise, Anger, Fear, Disgust, Sadness) were displayed by the experimenter. 
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The coder was allowed to endorse the presence of multiple emotions. Next the coder 
indicated which of the emotions displayed was the experimenter's primary emotion. The 
experimenter's primary emotion had to be the intended primary emotion and be coded as 
demonstrating an intensity rating of 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale in order for the trial to be 
included. Percentage of agreement (96.15%) and Cohen's kappa, K = .92, indicated high 
agreement on 'presence of emotion,' the variable indicating which of the six primary 
emotions were displayed by the experimenter. High reliability was also observed 
(percentage of agreement = 100%, K = 1.0) for primary emotion identified and for 
intensity of primary emotion (percentage of agreement = 100%, K = 1.0). No trials were 
excluded due to errors in experimenter affect display. 
Acknowledgement and mapping of behavioral response. The coding procedure 
that was used to code Acknowledgement and mapping of behavioral response in Chapter 
III was used to code this variable in the Surprise Box task. Percentage of agreement 
(100.0%) and Cohen's kappa, K = 1.0 indicated high reliability for both the 
acknowledgement and mapping variables. 
Imitation of behavioral response. The coding procedure that was used to code 
superficial imitation of the experimenter's behavioral response in Chapter III was used to 
code this variable in the Surprise Box task. Percentage of agreement (100.00%) and 
Cohen's kappa, K = 1.00 indicated very high reliability. 
Reach for box. A dichotomous variable was created to indicate whether or not the 
child attempted to touch the box. A child was coded to have attempted to touch the box if 
the child reached for it with an open hand. Percentage of agreement (100.00%) and 
Cohen's kappa, K = 1.00 indicated very high reliability. 
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Formation of opinion. The coding procedure that was used to code Formation of 
Opinion in Chapter III was used to code Formation of Opinion in the Surprise Box task. 
Percentage of agreement (100.00%) and Cohen's kappa, K = 1.00 indicated very high 
reliability . 
Data Analysis 
This study focused on comparing the behavioral reactions of children with DS and 
children with WS in two situations: (1) when the experimenter looked into a box and was 
joyful upon seeing its contents, and (2) when the experimenter looked into a box and was 
fearful upon seeing its contents. A between subjects design was used with approximately 
half of the children in each diagnostic group in the Joy condition and the remainder in the 
Fear condition. As all of the dependent variables included in the present chapter were 
dichotomous and the assumption of expected frequencies greater than 5 necessary to 
perform a chi-square analysis was violated, Fisher-exact test statistics were computed. 
Results 
Acknowledgment and Mapping of Behavioral Reaction 
Two Fisher-exact test statistics were computed to examine the relation between 
diagnostic group and the child's acknowledgment and mapping of the behavioral reaction 
(Ufw = .025). The relation between these variables was not significant in either the Joy 
condition (see Table 14; l[1, N = 22] = .21, Fisher's exactp = 1.00, odds ratio = 1.52, 
Cr95 = [0.11, 4.00]) or the Fear condition (see Table 15; X2[1, N = 18] = 0.28, Fisher's 
exactp = 1.00, odds ratio = 0.57, Cr95 = [0.07,4.64]). 
101 
Table 14 
Number of Children who 'Acknowledged and Mapped' the Experimenter's Emotion in the 
Joy Condition as a Function of Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not AcknowledgelMap 3 4 
AcknowledgedlMapped 8 7 
Table 15 
Number of Children who 'Acknowledged and Mapped' in the Fear Condition as a Function 
of Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not AcknowledgelMap 7 6 
AcknowledgedlMapped 2 3 
Imitation of Behavioral Reaction 
None of the children imitated the experimenter's behavioral reaction. 
Reach for Box 
Two Fisher-exact test statistics were performed to examine the relation between 
diagnostic group and whether or not the child reached for the box (Ufw = .025). The 
relation between these variables was not significant in either the Joy condition (see Table 
16; X2[1, N = 22] = 1.05, Fisher's exactp = 1.00, odds ratio cannot be computed as 1 cell 
has a frequency of 0) or the Fear condition (see Table 17; X2[1, N = 18] = 1.05, Fisher's 
exact p = 1.00, odds ratio = 1.00, CI.95 = [0.19, 5.36]). 
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Table 16 
Number of Children who Reached for the Box in the Joy Condition as a Function of 
Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not Reach o 
Reached lO 11 
Table 17 
Number of Children who Reachedfor the Box in the Fear Condition as a Function of 
Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not Touch 3 3 
Touched 6 6 
Formation of an Opinion 
Two Fisher-exact test statistics were calculated to examine the relation between 
diagnostic group and formation of an opinion. The relation between these variables did 
not reach criterion for a significant association in the Joy condition (see Table 18; i[l, N 
= 22] = 2.22, Fisher's exact p = .48, odds ratio cannot be computed as 1 cell has a 
frequency of 0). All of the children with DS and all of the children with WS who were 
rated as having formed an opinion were rated to have formed a positive opinion of the 
contents of the box. The relation between these variables also did not reach criterion for a 
significant association for the Fear condition (see Table 19; i[I, N = 18] = 0.23, Fisher's 
exact p = l.00, odds ratio = l.60, CJ95 = [0.24, lO.8I D. Of the children who were rated as 
having formed an opinion of the contents ofthe box, only one child with DS (of 6) and 
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one child with WS (of 5) was rated as having formed a negative opinion. Thus, most of 
the children who formed an opinion of the stimulus in the Fear condition were rated as 
having formed a positive opinion. 
Descriptive information was also collected to provide more specific information 
regarding the responses of children who formed a positive opinion in the Fear condition 
(DS: n = 5, WS: n = 4). For children with DS, the results were as follows: three children 
saw the experimenter's fearful reaction and then reached for the box, one child watched 
the experimenter's fearful reaction for its entire duration and then reached for the box, 
and one child decided the stimulus was an owl and maintained this opinion even after 
seeing the fearful reaction. For children with WS, two children saw the experimenter's 
fearful reaction and then reached for the box, one child communicated to the 
experimenter that she should not be afraid and intensely laughed at the experimenter, and 
one child demonstrated concerned intonation while asking the experimenter what was 
wrong while reaching for the box and then quickly changed to positive intonation while 
he asked if he could see. 
Table 18 
Number of Children who 'Formed an Opinion' in the Joy Condition as a Function of 
Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not Form an Opinion 2 o 
Formed an Opinion 9 11 
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Table 19 
Number o/Children who 'Formed an Opinion' in the Fear Condition as a Function 0/ 
Diagnostic Group 
Down Syndrome Williams Syndrome 
Did Not Form an Opinion 3 4 
Formed an Opinion 6 5 
Discussion 
In the present chapter, four research questions were addressed using a task similar 
to the Social Referencing task used in Chapter III but with one key difference: a 
reduction in the attentional demands on the child. The first research question addressed 
the likelihood that the two groups of children would acknowledge the adult's behavioral 
reaction and map it to the stimulus. Performance of children with DS and children with 
WS was once again comparable. When the experimenter demonstrated a joyful reaction 
toward the stimulus, the majority of children with DS and the majority of children with 
WS produced behaviors that demonstrated that they acknowledged the experimenter's 
reaction and mapped it to the stimulus. In contrast, when the experimenter evidenced a 
fearful reaction to the stimulus, few children in either group produced behaviors that 
demonstrated that they acknowledged the experimenter's reaction and mapped it to the 
stimulus. 
The second research question addressed the likelihood that the two groups of 
children would imitate the experimenter's behavioral reaction. It was predicted that 
children with WS would be more likely to imitate the experimenter than would children 
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with DS. However, no child in either diagnostic group imitated the experimenter's 
behavioral reaction. 
The third research question addressed the likelihood that the two groups of 
children would approach the stimulus (the contents of the box) to which the experimenter 
directed a behavioral reaction. Results indicated that the approach behavior of children in 
the two diagnostic groups was comparable with the majority of children in each group 
reaching for the box both in response to the experimenter's expressions of joy and the 
experimenter's expressions of fear. 
Finally, the fourth research question addressed the likelihood that the two groups 
of children would form an opinion of the stimulus. When the experimenter demonstrated 
a joyful reaction, the majority of children in both diagnostic groups formed an opinion of 
the stimulus in the Joy condition and all of the children who formed an opinion formed a 
positive one. When the experimenter demonstrated a fearful reaction, once again, the 
majority of children formed an opinion of the stimulus. However, despite the 
experimenter's fearful reaction, almost all of the children who formed an opinion of the 
stimulus formed a positive opinion; only one child in each diagnostic group formed a 
negative opinion. In addition, despite clearly seeing the experimenter's fearful reaction, 
most children in each group who formed a positive opinion reached for the stimulus 
without communicating disagreement with the experimenter or demonstrating behaviors 
suggesting they saw through the experimenter's fearful reaction. 
Overall, the results of the present study suggest that both children with DS and 
children with WS have difficulty comprehending the significance of another person's 
fearful reaction. This finding is consistent with that of Porter (2008), who found that 
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when controlling for MA, both individuals WS (n = 9; CA range: 6.0 - 43.67 years) and 
individuals with DS (n = 20; CA range: 6.75 - 40.75 years) demonstrated comparable 
difficulty with regard to recognizing expressions of fear as high mean proportions of 
errors for expressions of fear were observed for both groups, even when high intensity 
emotional stimuli were used (High Intensity Stimuli: WS = .56, DS = .56; Low Intensity 




From birth, children are immersed in a world that necessitates constant learning. 
One of the components important for psychological growth and effective functioning 
within the environment involves learning about what it means to be a person. Children 
develop an understanding of the world around them, who they are, who other people are, 
and how to negotiate interactions with other people and objects/events within the 
environment. In addition to being a source of comfort and support, people are a valuable 
source of information about the surrounding environment. Impairments in the ability to 
utilize other people's nonverbal communicative behaviors and in the ability to understand 
other people's actions in terms of their underlying mental states have severe 
repercussions, as can be seen in the case of ASDs (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). 
The present project was the first to directly investigate the social referencing 
process (use of another person as a source of information regarding novel or ambiguous 
situations) in two neurodevelopmental disorders that have been well defined genetically 
and are characterized by differing patterns of socio-cognitive development: DS and WS. 
The social referencing process requires a child to coordinate multiple abilities. Thus, if a 
child does not utilize a person as a source of information about objects and events in the 
environment, it may be difficult to specify where the child is encountering difficulties 
solely by observing the social referencing process. For this reason, in addition 
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to a Social Referencing task, the present project also included three studies that each 
examined one of the abilities fundamental to social referencing (initiation of joint 
attention, gaze following, and emotion recognition/emotional responsivity) to obtain 
clarifying information as to what difficulties are likely impeding the social referencing 
process. In this chapter, I summarize and discuss the implications of the findings across 
studies as well as provide suggestions for future directions for research. 
The Regulatory Function of Social Referencing 
The results of the Social Referencing study presented in Chapter III indicated 
differences in the behavioral responses of children with DS and children with WS both in 
situations in which the experimenter communicated a joyful message about an ambiguous 
stimulus and in situations in which the experimenter communicated a fearful message 
about an ambiguous stimulus. When the experimenter communicated a joyful message, 
results indicated that children with DS shifted their attention between the adult and the 
stimulus more than did children with WS. In addition, children with DS (75%) were more 
likely than were children with WS (40%) to produce behaviors that acknowledged the 
experimenter's joyful message and indicated that they mapped her message to the 
stimulus. Children with DS were also more likely (80%) than were children with WS 
(65%) to approach the stimulus. Comparisons of superficial imitation of the 
experimenter's facial expressions between the two groups did not reach criterion for a 
significant difference, with only a small proportion of each group (~5% of children with 
DS and 20% of children with WS) imitating the experimenter's joyful reaction. In the 
end, when the experimenter communicated a joyful message about the stimulus, the 
majority of children with DS (80%) and children with WS (65%) formed an opinion of 
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the stimulus and the vast majority of the opinions formed by children in each group were 
positive. 
When the experimenter communicated a fearful message about an ambiguous 
stimulus, a partially different pattern of findings was observed across the two groups of 
children. Once again, children with DS were more likely than were children with WS 
both to shift their attention between the stimulus and the experimenter and to approach 
the stimulus. However, the longest look to the experimenter by the children with WS was 
longer than the longest look to the experimenter by children with DS. In addition, the 
children with WS were more likely to imitate the experimenter's fearful expression than 
were the children with DS (DS = ~ II %, WS = 40%). Results also indicated that children 
with WS (35%) were less likely than were children with DS (60%) to form an opinion of 
the stimulus. In the end, 38% of the children with DS and 40% of the children with WS 
who formed an opinion of the fearful stimulus formed a negative opinion; the majority of 
children in each group who formed an opinion formed a positive one. Descriptive 
information obtained regarding the responses of the children who formed a positive 
opinion indicated that most of the children with DS and all of the children with WS, 
despite clearly seeing the experimenter's fearful expression, approached the stimulus 
without communicating disagreement with the experimenter or demonstrating behaviors 
suggesting they saw through her fearful reaction. 
These results highlight an attentional component in the social referencing process 
(the child's regulation of his or her attention between the adult and the stimulus) as well 
as an informational component (comprehension of the communicative significance of the 
fearful reaction). However, it is difficult to tell from this study alone if difficulties with 
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one or both of these components in the social referencing process are contributing to why 
children are not utilizing the experimenter as a source of information about the stimulus. 
To further complicate the situation, because the components that make up the social 
referencing process are so tightly intertwined within a naturalistic interaction, pinpointing 
the exact point in the process where a problem may have occurred is extremely difficult 
and tells us little regarding the children's strengths and weaknesses in the components 
whose use should have come after the identified problem occurred. However, despite 
these difficulties with interpretation, the results of the Social Referencing study have 
provided a direction in which to begin an exploration of the social referencing process. 
When we consider the attentional component of the social referencing process, we 
are considering the necessity for the child to link the experimenter's reaction to the 
stimulus. There are two fundamental abilities that a child should use to link the 
experimenter's reaction to the stimulus: initiating joint attention and gaze following. First, 
the child must be able to coordinate his or her attention between the object and the 
experimenter in a social context. That is, the child must initiate joint attention. The ability 
to initiate joint attention is important to the social referencing process, as the child must 
shift his or her attention from the stimulus to the experimenter in order to gain access to 
the message (experimenter's reaction). Secondly, once the child notices the message, the 
child must be able to follow the experimenter's gaze to identify the focus of the her 
attention. 
Once the child has linked the experimenter's reaction to the stimulus, the 
informational component of the social referencing process must be considered. In order 
for social referencing to occur, the child must interpret the communicative signal 
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provided by the experimenter. When considered on an interpersonal level, emotions 
provide a tool with which a person can establish, maintain, or disrupt interactions within 
the environment (Walden & Knieps, 1996). In the Social Referencing task used in 
Chapter III, the experimenter demonstrated either a joyful or a fearful reaction to the 
stimulus. In this context, for the social referencing process to occur, the child must 
comprehend the communicative significance of this emotionally valenced message. That 
is, the child must interpret the experimenter's reaction as an indication that either the 
stimulus is something enjoyable (when seeing the experimenter's joyful reaction) or that 
the stimulus is something to be feared (when seeing the experimenter's fearful reaction). 
While TD children are able to coordinate these multiple abilities such that they 
can use another person's appraisal of a situation to guide their own behavior by around 12 
months of age, this is not the case for children with syndromes associated with ID (e.g., 
Dickstein et aI., 1984; Feinman & Lewis, 1984; Klinnert et aI., 1986; Walden & Ogan, 
1988). Children are not born with a complete understanding of what it means to be a 
person or with a complete understanding of how human beings differ from objects. 
Children learn this information from their interactions with the people and objects around 
them. In the case of children who have syndromes associated with ID, delays in the 
acquisition of knowledge and skills are observed. As such, the present project also 
assessed three abilities that are fundamental to the social referencing process individually 
in order to obtain clarifying information as to what difficulties could be contributing to 
why children are not using the experimenter as a source of information in Chapter III. In 
the next three sections, each of these abilities is discussed separately. 
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Initiating Eye Contact 
The study presented in Chapter IV considered children's ability to shift attention 
from an object to an adult in response to the adult's production of ambiguous and non-
ambiguous gestures. Results indicated that both children with DS and children with WS 
were more likely to look at the experimenter in response to her ambiguous gestures 
(blocking or teasing) than they were to look at her in response to her unambiguous 
gesture (giving). In addition, the two groups of children were not statistically different 
from one another in terms of their likelihood of looking at the experimenter in response 
to her blocking and teasing gestures; most children in both groups looked at the 
experimenter in these situations. These results demonstrate that both children with DS 
and children with WS are likely to look to the adult if she produces a gesture that 
prevents the child from gaining access to an object of interest. By preventing the child 
from accessing the object, the experimenter produced an action that created a dyadic 
interaction. As such, these findings are consistent with the existing literature, which 
demonstrates that both children with DS and children with WS use eye contact relatively 
well in dyadic interactions (Kasari et aI., 1990; Laing et aI., 2002). 
The results presented in Chapter IV also demonstrated that children with DS were 
more likely to look to the experimenter in response to her giving gesture than were the 
children with WS. Since the experimenter's giving gesture did not attempt to draw the 
child's attention to her, this situation remained triadic in nature. As such, this finding 
provides further support for the growing body of literature demonstrating that children 
with DS evidence better joint attention skills than do children with WS of the same CA 
(Rowe et aI., 2005). 
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Framed within the context of the social referencing process, by not shifting their 
attention between the adult and the object of interest as much as children with DS do, 
children with WS are potentially getting access to less information about the situation at 
hand than are the children with DS. If this is the case, it is easy to see how breakdowns in 
interactions for the children with WS can occur. In addition, it is important to point out 
that not only does the child's lack of shifting attention limit his or her understanding of 
the social interaction, but it may also influence the understanding of the person 
interacting with the child. For example, both the research assistants who coded the 
videotapes for this study and the experimenters who interacted with the children 
frequently reported that it was easier to interpret the behavioral responses of the children 
with DS than those of the children with WS, as the children with DS gave the adult "more 
information." Interestingly, this impression was obtained even though the children with 
WS had considerably more advanced language skills than did the children with DS, many 
of whom were able to produce only a few single words or manual signs. In contrast, the 
coders and experimenters often said that the interactions with the children with WS were 
"weird" and that they were not entirely sure what was happening except that clearly 
"something had gone wrong." 
Gaze Following 
The study presented in Chapter V considered children's ability to shift attention 
from the experimenter to the object that was the focus of the experimenter's attention, that 
is, the child's ability to follow another person's gaze. Results indicated that both children 
with DS and children with WS were more likely to follow the experimenter's head tum 
when her eyes were open than when her eyes were closed. This finding indicates that 
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both groups of children demonstrated sensitivity to the meaningfulness of a person's eyes. 
That being said, the findings also indicated that children with DS were more likely to 
follow another person's head tum paired with open eyes than were children with WS. The 
finding that children with WS were less likely than were children with DS to respond to 
joint attention acts adds more evidence to the growing body of literature demonstrating 
that children with WS evidence impairments in response to joint attention (John & 
Mervis, 2010; Klein-Tasman et aI., 2007; Laing et aI., 2002; Lincoln et aI., 2007; Rowe et 
aI.,2005). 
Framed within the context of the social referencing process, impairments in the 
child's ability to follow the adult's gaze may result in the child not being able to identify 
the source of the adult's emotional reaction. Without a source for the reaction, the 
experimenter's reaction may become an ambiguous situation in and of itself and cause 
increased confusion for the child. It is possible that this could be an explanation for why 
so many children did not form an opinion of the stimulus in the Fear condition of the 
Social Referencing Study (Chapter III). On the other hand, it is also possible that without 
a source for the reaction, the intent of the communication is lost. As pointed out by 
Meltzoff (1995), human beings would be difficult to predict and even harder to explain if 
we had to restrict our understanding of them to their physical behaviors and movements. 
It is possible then that not identifying the source of the experimenter's reaction could be a 
contributing reason behind the finding reported in Chapter III that children with WS were 
more likely to superficially imitate the experimenter's emotionally valenced reactions 
than were children with DS. This explanation could account for why no imitation was 
observed in the Surprise Box study presented in Chapter VI, when the source of the 
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experimenter's reaction was much more obvious. Alternately, the lack of imitation in the 
Surprise Box study could be due to children being more interested in determining what 
was in the box than they were in what the experimenter was doing. The finding in 
Chapter VI that the majority of children in each group reached for the box in both the Joy 
and the Fear conditions is consistent with this possibility. 
Utilizing Emotional Reactions 
The study presented in Chapter VI considered children's ability to comprehend the 
communicative significance of another person's emotionally valenced behavioral reaction 
in a task with a reduced attentional demand on the child. In situations in which the 
experimenter communicated a joyful message about the ambiguous stimulus, results 
indicated that the reactions of children with DS and children with WS were comparable. 
The majority of children in both groups (DS = 73%, WS = 64%) produced behaviors 
acknowledging the experimenter's joyful message and demonstrating that they mapped 
that message to the stimulus. In addition, most children with DS (91 %) and all of the 
children with WS (100%) attempted to approach the stimulus and most children in both 
groups formed a positive opinion of it (DS = 82%, WS = 100%). 
When the experimenter communicated a fearful message about the ambiguous 
stimulus, while the reactions of both children with DS and children with WS were 
comparable in response to the fearful communication, the pattern of findings was 
different from that observed in the Joy condition. Few children with DS (22%) or 
children with WS (33%) produced behaviors that demonstrated that they acknowledged 
the experimenter's fearful reaction and mapped it to the stimulus. At the same time, the 
majority of children in both groups reached for the stimulus (DS = 67%, WS = 67%). 
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Finally, although the majority of children with DS (67%) and children with WS (56%) 
formed an opinion of the fearful stimulus, only one child in each group formed a negative 
opinion of it. In addition, it was found that, despite clearly seeing the experimenter's 
fearful expression, most of the children in each group who formed a positive opinion 
reached for the box without communicating disagreement with the experimenter or 
demonstrating behaviors suggesting they saw through the fearful reaction. 
While one must be careful in interpreting the findings in Chapter VI due to the 
limited sample size, the reactions of children in the two groups were quite similar. When 
the adult communicated a joyful message about the ambiguous stimulus, the majority of 
the children with DS (75%) and the majority of children with WS (55%) formed positive 
opinions of the stimulus as well. However, when the adult communicated a fearful 
message about the stimulus, only one child with DS and only one child with WS formed 
a negative opinion of the fearful stimulus. 
Given the existing body of literature demonstrating that both individuals with DS 
and individuals with WS evidence more difficulty interpreting fearful expressions than do 
their same age peers (Gagliardi et aI., 2003; Kasari et aI., 2001; Plesa-Skwerer et aI., 
2006; Porter, 2008; Williams et aI., 2005), it is plausible that the findings from Chapter 
VI provide another indication that children with DS and children with WS have difficulty 
comprehending the communicative significance of another person's fearful reactions. 
When considered within the context of the social referencing process, this could explain 
why so many children with DS approached the stimulus in the Social Referencing task 
and formed a positive opinion of it despite being more likely than the children with WS 
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to shift attention between the experimenter and the stimulus and more likely to 
acknowledge the experimenter's fearful response and map it to the stimulus. 
Future Directions 
Social referencing is a complex process because it involves the interaction of 
multiple abilities within a social context. However, despite this complexity, the results 
from the present project provide valuable information that may be used as a guide for 
future studies. In this section, I discuss possible directions for future research on children 
with DS and children with WS and suggest some factors that should be examined as 
potential contributors to social referencing ability. 
It will be important to continue to examine the abilities that are fundamental to the 
social referencing process and determine their role in the later socio-cognitive and socio-
communicative challenges experienced by individuals with DS and individuals with WS. 
More specifically, it is important that future studies focus on the development of joint 
attention and examine the impact of early delays in joint attention on later development 
for both children with DS and children with WS. This will be a valuable line of research 
in WS in particular. By not shifting their attention between objects and people as much as 
other children do, it is likely that children with WS are getting access to less information 
about both people and objects within their environment than do other children of the 
same age and intellectual abilities. Much of how children learn about other people's 
underlying states comes from observing people's interactions with the surrounding world. 
As such, these early impairments may be contributing to the significant social cognitive 
impairments observed in older children and adults with WS. 
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Furthermore, future studies should examine the development of gaze following 
and emotional responsivity/emotion recognition in children with DS and children with 
WS. In particular, more research is needed examining the role of gaze following in 
children's understanding of emotion. Early difficulties in efficiently linking people's 
actions/reactions/messages to their referents in the environment are likely to have 
significant effects on later language, social cognitive, and social emotional development. 
In addition, it is important that more research be conducted focusing on children's 
comprehension of the communicative significance of emotionally valenced messages. It 
is plausible that the results from the present project indicate that both children with DS 
and children with WS have difficulty interpreting the communicative significance of 
fearful reactions. However, it is vital that more research be conducted to determine when 
and in what situations these two groups of children are able to comprehend the 
communicative significance of emotionally-valenced messages, especially those that 
involve negative emotions such as fear. Research in these areas will not only provide a 
much more complete understanding of the behavioral phenotypes associated with these 
neurodevelopmental disorders and the development of these behavioral phenotypes but 
also may help shed light on the intricacies ofthe development of these processes in TD 
children. 
It is also important that future studies consider the possible contributions of other 
factors to social referencing and to the abilities that are fundamental to this process. 
Preliminary evidence that two such factors (executive functioning and "wary" 
temperament) may influence social referencing is available in the literature. In a study 
examining the executive functioning abilities of children with autism (n = 18; mean CA = 
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51.11 months) relative to a group of children with DD of mixed-etiology (n = 17; mean 
CA = 51.00 months), Griffith and colleagues (1999) examined the relation between 
executive functioning abilities and joint attention abilities in an attempt to explore the 
hypothesis that deficits in executive functioning in autism may be the underlying cause of 
the significant impairments observed in joint attention. The authors found a significant 
negative correlation between the number of perseveration errors on the Spatial Reversal 
task (Kaufman, Leckman, & Ort, 1989) and both Initiating Joint Attention and 
Responding to Joint Attention on the ESCS when both the autism group and the DD 
group were combined. The Spatial Reversal task builds up a prepotent response and then 
requires the child to inhibit that response once it is no longer successful. More recently, 
Sheinkopf, Mundy, Claussen, and Willoughby (2004) theorized, in interpreting their 
findings from a study comparing infant joint attention skill and preschool behavioral 
outcomes in children with a history of prenatal exposure to cocaine, that joint attention 
ability may reflect, at least in part, the child's ability to inhibit prepotent responses and 
initiate appropriate actions in social situations. 
The results from the present project also are consistent with this body of research. 
Based on parental report on the BRIEF-Preschool, children with DS were found to have 
better inhibitory self-control (as well as better overall executive functioning abilities, 
shifting, and emotional control) than did the children with WS. These differences in 
inhibitory self-control and other executive functioning abilities favoring the children with 
DS, may explain why despite having lower overall intellectual ability and lower verbal 
ability, children with DS evidenced better initiation of joint attention and gaze following 
abilities than did children with WS. Given this body of evidence, further research on the 
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potential role of executive functioning in the social referencing process, as well as in 
social cognitive development more generally is warranted. 
Preliminary evidence also exists that temperament, particularly "wary" 
temperament, may affect the social referencing process. Hornik and Gunnar (1988) 
examined the social referencing responses of 12-month-old TD infants (n = 16) and 18-
month-old TD infants (n = 16) in their first encounter with a large black rabbit. The 
results of this study demonstrated that infants who were classified as demonstrating a 
'wary' initial reaction to the rabbit were more likely than were infants classified as 
demonstrating a 'bold' initial reaction to the rabbit to reference their mothers when the 
rabbit was first encountered. 
The differences found in the reactions of children with DS and children with WS 
in the present project may be in part due to differences in temperament. Klein and Mervis 
(2003), when attempting to develop a personality profile specific to WS, found that very 
low mean ratings on the Children's Behavior Questionnaire (CBQ; Rothbart, Ahadi, 
Hershey, & Fisher, 2001) Shyness scale, a scale measuring slow or inhibited approach in 
novel or uncertain situations, together with high mean ratings on the CBQ Empathy scale 
characterized 96% of their WS sample but only 15% of their mixed etiology group 
(which included several children with DS). The findings of Hornik and Gunnar (1988) 
suggest that if as expected based on Klein-Tasman and Mervis's (2003) results, children 
with DS score higher than children with WS on the CBQ Shyness scale, children with DS 
would be more likely to evidence a 'wary' initial reaction and therefore be more likely to 
reference their mothers in ambiguous situations such as the social referencing task. Given 
this possibility, it is important that future studies examining the social referencing process 
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in children with DS and children with WS consider whether or not 'shyness' is a factor 
contributing to the advantages shown by children with DS and the difficulties evidenced 
by children with WS. The possible contribution of other aspects of temperament also 
should be considered. 
Finally, while the findings from the present study are important in that they have 
provided a direction in which to begin an exploration of the specific difficulties 
encountered within the social referencing process, the analyses in this project were 
focused on variables that were expected to differentiate children with DS from children 
with WS. These variables may not be the same as the ones that are most likely to provide 
insight into within-syndrome differences in social referencing or the fundamental abilities 
underlying social referencing. Furthermore, the variables most likely to evidence within-
syndrome differentiation may not be the same for children with DS and children with 
WS. Given the differing reactions evidenced by children with DS and children with WS, 
it will be important for future studies to include a within-subjects approach when 
examining the social referencing process and to begin examining the role of individual 
differences among children who have the same syndrome on the social referencing 
process. These studies will allow more specific information to be obtained which will 
potentially provide insight into how specific actions taken or not taken by a child in an 
ambiguous situation impact the process of social referencing as a whole. 
Conclusions 
In summary, the present project is the first to directly examine the process of 
using another person as a source of information regarding novel or ambiguous situations, 
referred to as social referencing, in children with DS and children with WS. The results 
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of the Social Referencing study suggest that both groups of children are not using another 
person's expression of fear to regulate their own behavior in ambiguous situations. 
However, since the different abilities a child must utilize in order to use another person's 
appraisal of the situation as information to guide his or her behavior are so tightly 
intertwined in complex social interactions like the social referencing process, it is 
difficult to tell from this study alone exactly what kind of challenges children in these 
groups are encountering. In order to obtain clarifying information as to what kinds of 
difficulties children with DS and children with WS are encountering within the social 
referencing process, the present project also included follow-up studies which examined 
three abilities that are fundamental to social referencing: initiation of joint attention, gaze 
following, and emotional responsivity. 
Taken together, the results of the follow-up studies suggest that, at the group 
level, there are both similarities and differences in the problems encountered by children 
with DS and children with WS within the social referencing process. Both children with 
DS and children with WS had difficulty interpreting the communicative significance of 
the experimenter's fearful reactions. However, children with DS were more successful 
than were children with WS both at coordinating attention between the object and the 
experimenter and at identifying the source of her interest. Furthermore, despite 
demonstrating poorer overall intellectual ability and more limited verbal ability, children 
with DS evidenced better executive functioning than did children with WS. This 
difference in executive functioning may contribute to some of the advantages shown by 
children with DS. 
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It is important that future studies continue to examine the social referencing 
process in these two neurodevelopmental disorders and the impact of executive 
functioning abilities and temperament characteristics on social referencing. If these two 
groups of children are having difficulty using another person's fearful expression to guide 
their own behavior, they can inadvertently put themselves into dangerous situations. 
Increasing our understanding of the specific nature of the problems encountered during 
the social referencing process is an important step toward the development of 
interventions to address these difficulties as well as the more general social 
communication challenges experienced by children with DS and children with WS. 
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